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1 Introduction
A signicant component of the philosophical interpretation of physics involves in-
vestigation of what fundamental kinds of things there are in the world if reality is as
physics describes it to be. One candidate entity has proven perennially controversial:
spacetime.1e argument about whether spacetime is an entity in its own right goes
by the name of the substantivalist–relationalist debate. Substantivalists maintain that
a complete catalogue of the fundamental objects in the universe lists, in addition
to the elementary constituents of material entities, the basic parts of spacetime.
Relationalists maintain that spacetime does not enjoy a basic, non-derivative ex-
istence. According to the relationalist, claims apparently about spacetime itself
are ultimately to be understood as claims about material entities and the possible
patterns of spatiotemporal relations that they can instantiate.
In his Principia, Newton famously distinguished absolute from relative space
and states that the former “of its own nature without reference to anything external,
always remains homogeneous and immovable” (Newton, 1999, 408). Newton’s de-
scription of, and arguments for, absolute space are commonly (and rightly) taken to
be a statement and defence of substantivalism. In Section 2, I consider Newton’s
reasons for postulating absolute space before examining, in Section 3, one of the
strongest argument against its existence, the so-called kinematic shi argument.
ese arguments highlight the close connection between the spatiotemporal symme-
tries of a dynamical theory and the spacetime ontology that the theory is naturally
interpreted as committed to. It turns out that the Galilean covariance of Newtonian
mechanics tells against both substantival space and the most obvious relationalist
alternative.
1Strictly speaking, the controversy has concerned two candidate entities. Prior to Minkowski’s
reformulation of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in four-dimensional form, the debate was
about the existence of space. Since then, the debate has been about the existence of spacetime. For
the sake of brevity, I will oen only mention spacetime, leaving the “and/or space” implicit.
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With hindsight, the natural substantivalist response to this predicament is to
jettison space for spacetime. Section 4 reviews orthodox spacetime substantivalism.
e most defensible substantivalist interpretation of Newtonian physics has much
in common with a very natural interpretation of relativistic physics. From this
perspective, our current best theory of space and time vindicates Newton rather than
his relationalist critics, contrary to what early philosophical interpreters claimed
(e.g. Reichenbach, 1924).
Section 5 is a sceptical review of two antisubstantivalist themes that motivate
some contemporary relationalists. Its conclusion is that the aspiring relationalist’s
best hope is Ockham’s razor, so the focus shis onto the details of relationalists’ prof-
fered alternatives to substantivalism.e move to a four-dimensional perspective
expands the range of possibilities available to the classical relationalist. In Section 6
I distinguish three strategies that the relationalist can pursue in the face of the chal-
lenge posed by Galilean covariance and consider how the corresponding varieties
of relationalism fare when one moves from classical to relativistic physics. It turns
out that a number of well-known relationalist views nd a natural home in this
framework.
A review of the substantivalist–relationalist debate cannot get away without
mention of Earman andNorton’s (in)famous adaptation of Einstein’sHole Argument.
In the nal section, I highlight what many see as the most promising substantivalist
response and relate it to so-called structural realist approaches to spacetime.
2 Newton’s Bucket
Newton’s best-known discussion of absolute space comes in a scholium to the
denitions at the start of the Principia. According to the once-standard reading,
Newton’s purpose in the Scholium is to argue for the existence of substantival space
via the existence of absolute motion, which he supposedly takes to be established
by his famous bucket experiment and two-globes thought experiment (see, e.g.,
Sklar, 1974, 182–4). While there is now widespread agreement that this account
badly misrepresents Newton’s arguments, there is less consensus over how they
in fact should be understood.2anks to Koyré (1965) and Stein (1967), it is now
recognised that, in order to understand Newton’s Scholium, one has to appreciate
that Newton was in large part reacting to Descartes’ claims about the nature of
motion. I briey review the relevant Cartesian background before giving an account
of Newton’s arguments that is essentially in agreement with that of Rynasiewicz
(1995).
2For a varied sample of competing interpretations, see Laymon (1978), Rynasiewicz (1995, 2004)
and DiSalle (2002, 2006), who goes so far as to claim that Newton was not a substantivalist.
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Descartes was one of the rst natural philosophers to put the principle of inertia—
the claim that bodies unaected by net external forces remain at rest or move
uniformly in a straight line—at the centre of his physics (Descartes, 1644, II; 37, 39).
At the same time, and apparently without recognising the problem, he espoused an
account of motion that is hopelessly incompatible with it. Descartes distinguishes
motion in an everyday sense of the term frommotion in a strict, philosophical sense.
Motion in the ordinary sense is said to be change of place (ibid., II; 24) and Descartes
gives a relational denition of a body’s place in terms of that body’s position relative
to external reference bodies regarded as immobile (ibid., II; 10, 13). Which bodies
are to be treated as reference bodies is an arbitrary matter. Descartes’ ordinary
notion of motion is therefore a relative one: a given body may be said to be moving
uniformly, non-uniformly or not moving at all, depending on which other bodies
are taken to be at rest (ibid., II; 13). In contrast, Descartes’ denition of motion in the
strict sense, while still relational, was supposed to secure a unique proper motion
for each body (ibid., II; 31). True motion is dened as “the transfer of one piece of
matter, or of one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate
contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies”
(ibid., II; 25, emphasis in the original).3
Newton gave a single denition of motion, as change of place, but he also recog-
nised two kinds of motion, depending on whether the places in question were the
parts of a relative space (dened in terms of distances relative to material reference
bodies) or the parts of substantival space. Newton’s relative motion, therefore, corre-
sponds closely to Descartes’ motion in the ordinary sense. It is the motion we most
directly observe and, Newton agreed, it is what we mean by “motion” in everyday
contexts. But, he insisted, when it comes to doing physics, we need to abstract from
such observations and consider a body’s true motion, which, he argued, has to be
dened in terms of an independently-existing absolute space.
Newton’s arguments appeal to alleged “properties, causes and eects” of true
motion. His aim is to show that various species of relative motion, including Carte-
sian proper motion (though this is not targeted by name), fail to have the requisite
characteristics. If one assumes, as Newton tacitly did, that true motion can only
be some kind of privileged relative motion or else is motion with respect to an
3In 1633, on hearing of the Church’s condemnation of Galileo for claiming that the Earth moved,
Descartes suppressed an early statement of his physics, which did not contain his later relational
claims about the nature of motion. It is frequently (and plausibly) conjectured that Descartes’ ocial
views on motion were devised to avoid Church censure. However, the precise manner in which
Descartes’ denitions secure the Earth’s lack of true motion suggest that he was genuinely committed
to a relational conception of motion. What does the work in securing the Earth’s rest is not that, in
Descartes’ cosmology, there is no relative motion with respect to immediately contiguous bodies
(Descartes explicitly says there is such motion; ibid. III; 28); it is that Cartesian true motion is motion
with respect to those contiguous bodies that are regarded as at rest.
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independently existing entity, Newton’s preferred option wins by default.at each
body has a unique, true motion and that such motion has the purported properties,
causes and eects, are unargued assumptions.
Newton’s claims about the properties of true motion arguably beg the question
against the Cartesian.e arguments from causes and eects are more interesting,
both because they connect with physics and because their premises were accepted
by the Cartesians.e particular eect of true motion that Newton cites is almost an
immediate corollary of the principle of inertia: bodies that are undergoing genuine
circular motion “endeavour to recede from the axis” because, at each instant, their
natural, inertial motion is along the tangent at that point; they only follow their
curved path because of the application of a centripetal force.
Descartes fully endorsed these claims about circular motion. Indeed, they
formed a central component of his model of planetary motions and the cosmos
(e.g. Descartes, 1644, III; 58–62). His denition of true motion, however, fails to t
these phenomena, as Newton’s bucket experiment illustrates. Newton asks us to
consider a water-lled bucket suspended by a wound cord. Once released, as the
cord unwinds, the bucket starts to rotate. Initially, the water is at rest and its surface
is at. As friction gradually transfers the bucket’s motion to the water, the water’s
surface becomes ever more concave until its rate of rotation reaches a maximum
and it is comoving with the bucket.e concavity of the water’s surface reveals its
endeavour to recede from the axis of rotation. According to Descartes’ denition of
true motion, however, the water is at rest both before the bucket is released and at
the end of the experiment, when the water and bucket are once again at relative rest,
even though the water now manifests an eect of true rotation. It might also seem
that Descartes should count the water as truly moving just aer the bucket has been
released, because it is transferred from the vicinity of bodies in immediate contact
with it (viz., the sides of the bucket), even though, at this stage, the water’s surface
is at. e eects of true motion are not correlated with Descartes’ denition of
true motion in the way they are supposed to be. Newton concludes that the eect
revealing true rotation “does not depend on the change of position of the water with
respect to [immediately] surrounding bodies, and thus true circular motion cannot
be [dened in terms of] such changes of position” (Newton, 1999, 413).4
4e paragraph describing the bucket experiment completes Newton’s arguments for his account
of true motion in terms of absolute space but it is not the end the Scholium. Aer a brief paragraph
that explicitly concludes: “Hence relative quantities are not the quantities themselves, whose names
they bear, but are only sensible measures of them”, there follows a long, nal paragraph describing
a thought experiment involving two globes attached by a cord in a universe in which no other
observable objects exist.e purpose of this thought experiment is not to further argue for absolute
space by, e.g., describing a situation in which there is absolute motion (revealed by a tension in the
cord) and yet no relative motion whatsoever. Instead, Newton’s purpose is to demonstrate how true
motion can (partially) be empirically determined, despite the imperceptibility of the space with
respect to which it is dened: the tension in the cord is a measure of the rate of rotation and, by
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e Principia’s Scholium on space, time andmotion is no longer our only source
for Newton’s views on these topics. In the 1960s, a pre-Principiamanuscript, known
aer its rst line as De Gravitatione, was published for the rst time (Newton,
2004). In De Grav, Newton quite explicitly targets Descartes, and one argument
is particularly telling.5 Newton points out that, according to Descartes’ denition
of motion, no body has a determinate velocity, and there is no denite trajectory
that it follows. From moment to moment a body’s motion is dened with respect to
those bodies in immediate contact with it, which (for any body in motion) change
from moment to moment.ere is nothing in this picture that allows us to identify
at some time the exact places through which a body has travelled and so a fortiori
nothing that can tell us whether these places constitute a straight line which the
body has traversed at a uniform rate. Descartes’ account of true motion, therefore,
cannot secure a fact of the matter about whether a body is moving uniformly, as
the principle of inertia requires. Newton concludes: “So it is necessary that the
denition of places, and hence of local motion, be referred to some motionless
being such as. . . space in so far as it is seen to be truly distinct from bodies” (Newton,
2004, 20–1).
Talk of a “being” that is “truly distinct from bodies” indicates that Newton’s
alternative to Cartesian motion involves a variety of substantivalism.e waters are
muddied, however, by Newton’s explicit denial in De Grav that space is a substance.
Newton’s position does qualify as version of substantivalism as dened above: ac-
cording to Newton, space is a genuine entity of a fundamental kind. Newton’s denial
that space is a substance comes in a passage where he also denies both that it is
merely a property (“accident”) and that it is “nothing at all”. In fact, of the three
categories—substance, accident or nothing—Newton states that space is closest in
nature to substance. His two reasons for denying that space is a substance relate
only to how this category was understood in the then-dominant Scholastic tradition.
In particular, space was disqualied from being a substance because, on Newton’s
view, it does not act and because, in a certain rather technical sense, Newton did
not regard it as a self-subsistent entity.6
In postulating space as an entity with its own manner of existence, Newton was
directly following a number of the early modern atomists, such as Patrizi (1943,
227, 240–1), Gassendi (see, e.g., Grant, 1981, 209) and Charleton (1654, 66).ese
authors all treated space asmore substantial than traditional Aristotelian substances.
And there are striking structural parallels between some of the arguments in De
measuring how this tension changes as dierent forces are applied to opposite faces of the globes,
one can also determine the axis and sense of the rotation.
5As has been emphasised by Stein (1967, 269–71); the argument is also singled out by Barbour
(1989, 616–7).
6Since Newton held that everything that exists exists somewhere, the existence of any other being
entails the existence of space (see Stein, 2002, 300, n. 32, for further discussion).
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Grav and those in Charleton’s book, which we know from one of Newton’s early
notebooks that Newton had studied.e conclusion must be that in postulating
substantival space Newton adopted, albeit for truly original reasons, a metaphysical
package already very much on the table.
3 e Puzzle of Galilean Invariance
For Newton’s rst two laws of motion to make sense, there needs to be a fact of the
matter about whether a body’s motion is uniform and, if it is not, a quantitative
measure of how it is changing. Newton recognised that Descartes’ denitions of
motion failed to secure this and signed up to a metaphysics that underwrites the
required quantities. ere is a sense, though, in which Newton’s absolute space
underwrites too much.e problem arises because of the symmetries of Newtonian
mechanics, in particular its Galilean invariance.
3.1 Spacetime and Dynamical Symmetries
e relevant notions of symmetry can be introduced in terms of coordinate transfor-
mations. Given our topic, a little care is needed because the substantivalist and the
relationalist do not share a conception of a coordinate system. Roughly speaking, a
spacetime coordinate system is a map from spacetime into R4 but, of course, only
the substantivalist thinks of spacetime as an genuine entity.7e relationalist thinks
of a coordinate system as assigning quadruples of real numbers (t, x , y, z) = (t, x⃗)
to material events rather than to spacetime points. And, whereas the substantivalist
will view every quadruple of a coordinate system as assigned to something, the
relationalist will view some sets of coordinate values (those that the substantivalist
thinks of as assigned to unoccupied regions) as simply not assigned to anything at
all.
Despite this dierence, both substantivalists and relationalists will view certain
coordinate systems as kinematically privileged in the sense of being optimally adapted
to the particular spatiotemporal quantities that they each recognise. In the context of
classical mechanics, the natural relationalist alternative to Newton’s substantivalism
is Leibnizian relationalism.8 According to this view, a possible history of the universe
is given by a sequence of relative particle congurations: the primitive spatiotemporal
7Recall, also, that for the Newtonian substantivalist the basic entity is still space. Until space-
time substantivalism is explicitly introduced in Section 4, reference to spacetime points should
be understood as reference to ordered pairs of point-like substantival places with instants of time,
and reference to point-like material events as reference to instantaneous states of persisting point
particles.
8is terminology is established (see. e.g., Maudlin, 1993, 187). No suggestion that the historical
Leibniz was a Leibnizian relationalist is intended.
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facts about the universe are comprised solely of facts about the instantaneous relative
distances between particles (assumed to obey the constraints of Euclidean geometry)
and facts about the time intervals between the successive instantaneous material
congurations. e ways in which a coordinate system can be adapted to these
quantities is straightforward. e time coordinate, t, is chosen so that, for any
material events e and e′, the dierence, t(e) − t(e′), corresponds to the temporal
interval between e and e′, and is positive or negative according to whether e occurs
later or earlier than e′. Finally, spatial coordinates are chosen so that, for all particles
i , j and for all times,
√(xi − x j)2 + (yi − y j)2 + (zi − z j)2 = ri j, where ri j is the
instantaneous inter-particle distance between i and j. Assuming that these distances
evolve smoothly over time, one also requires that each particle’s spatial coordinates
are smooth functions of the time coordinate.
Coordinate systems that encode the Leibnizian relationalist quantities in this
way are sometimes known as rigid Euclidean coordinate systems (Friedman, 1983,
82). If a particular coordinate system (t, x⃗) satises these constraints then so will
any (t′, x⃗′) related to it by a member of the Leibniz group9 of transformations:
x⃗′ = R(t)x⃗ + a⃗(t),
t′ = t + d . (Leib)
R(t) is an orthogonal matrix that implements a time-dependent rotation. e
components of a⃗(t) are smooth functions of time that implement an arbitrary time-
dependent spatial translation and d is an arbitrary constant that changes the choice
of temporal origin.
e manner in which a coordinate system can be adapted to the Newtonian’s
spatiotemporal quantities is very similar. Mutatis mutandis, the substantivalist
imposes the same constraints as the relationalist, although now the spatial and
temporal distance relations to which the coordinate values are to be adapted hold
between the points of spacetime rather than (only) between material events.10ere
are also the substantivalists’ trademark “same place over time” facts to encode.
Here we simply require that the spatial coordinates of each point of space remain
constant.e transformations that relate coordinate systems adapted to the full set of
Newtonian spatiotemporal quantities form a proper subgroup of the Leibniz group
(it might appropriately be labelled the Newton group11) since the only rotations and
9ere is no established label for these transformations. I follow Bain (2004, 350, fn 6); see also
Earman (1989, 30–1). Ehlers (1973a, 74) calls this group of transformations the kinematical group.
10Subject to the qualications in footnote 7.
11Cf. Earman (1989, 34). Ehlers (1973a, 74) follows Weyl in referring to this group of transforma-
tions as the elementary group.
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spatial translations that preserve the extra constraint are time-independent:
x⃗′ = Rx⃗ + c⃗,
t′ = t + d . (New)
Identied in this way, the Leibniz and Newton groups are examples of spacetime
symmetry groups: they are groups of transformations that preserve spatiotemporal
structure (as encoded in coordinate systems). A conceptually distinct route to iden-
tifying special classes of coordinate transformations goes via the dynamical laws of
a particular theory. A dynamical symmetry group is a group that preserves the form
of the equations that express the dynamical laws. Since the Leibnizian relationalist
holds that every rigid Euclidean coordinate system is optimally adapted to all the
real spatiotemporal quantities, they might expect such coordinate systems to be
dynamically equivalent. In other words, it is natural for someone who thinks that
the Leibniz group is a spacetime symmetry group to expect it to be a dynamical
symmetry group as well.is might indeed be the case if, for example, the dynami-
cal laws dealt directly with the relative distances between bodies. But Newton’s laws
do not. Instead they presuppose that individual bodies have determinate motions
independently of their relations to other bodies. If Newton’s laws take their canon-
ical form in a given coordinate system K (which, we may imagine, is adapted to
Newtonian space and time), then they will not take the same form in a coordinate
system, K′, related to K by an arbitrary member of the Leibniz group.e equations
that hold relative to K′ will involve additional terms corresponding to source-free
‘pseudo forces’ that, the Newtonian maintains, are artefacts of K′’s acceleration with
respect to substantival space.
3.2 e Kinematic Shi Argument
e mismatch between dynamical symmetries and (what Leibnizian relationalists
regard as) spacetime symmetries is a problem for the relationalist. But a similar
problem aicts the Newtonian substantivalist. Whilst the Newton group is a dy-
namical symmetry group of classical mechanics, it is not the full symmetry group.
e equations that express Newton’s three laws of motion and particular Newtonian
force laws (such as the law of universal gravitation) are invariant under a wider
range of coordinate transformations, namely those constituting the Galilei group:
x⃗′ = Rx⃗ + v⃗ t + c⃗,
t′ = t + d . (Gal)
As in (New), the rotation matrix is time-independent, but now uniform time-
dependent translations of the spatial coordinates (“boosts”) are allowed.
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Let’s stipulate that two coordinate systems are adapted to the same frame of
reference if and only if they are related by an element of the Newton group.12 Two
coordinate systems related by a non-trivial Galilean boost are then adapted to
dierent frames of reference. However, if Newton’s laws hold with respect to either
frame, they hold with respect to both of them. In particular, both frames might be
inertial frames in that, with respect to them, force-free bodies move uniformly in
straight lines.
is gives rise to the following epistemological embarrassment for the Newto-
nian substantivalist. Imagine a possible worldW ′ just like the actual world except
that, at every moment, the absolute velocity of each material object inW ′ diers
from its actual value by a xed amount (say, by two metres per second in a direction
due North).W ′ is an example of a world that is kinematically shied relative to the
actual universe. Two kinematically-shied worlds are observationally indistinguish-
able because, by construction, the histories of relative distances between material
objects in each world are exactly the same.e worlds dier only over how the ma-
terial universe as a whole is moving with respect to space. Since substantival space is
not directly detectible, this is not an observable dierence. Further, the Galilean in-
variance of Newtonian mechanics means that any two kinematically-shied worlds
either both satisfy Newton’s laws, or neither does.
e upshot is that the Newtonian substantivalist is committed to the physical
reality of certain quantities, absolute velocities, that are in principle undetectable
given the symmetries of the dynamical laws. Given howW ′ was specied in the
previous paragraph, we know it is not the actual world. But consider a world,W ′′,
just like the actual world in terms of the relative distances between bodies at each
moment but in which, at 12 a.m. on 1st January 2000, the absolute velocity of the
Eiel Tower is exactly 527ms−1 due North. For all we know,W ′′ is the actual world.13
To paraphraseMaudlin (1993, 192), theremay be no a priori reason why all physically
real properties should be experimentally discoverable but one should at least be
uneasy about empirically inaccessible physical facts; ceteris paribus, one should
prefer a theory that does without them.14
12In spacetime terms, the notion of a frame of reference implicit in this stipulation corresponds
to the following: a bration of spacetime that species a standard of rest; a foliation of spacetime that
species a standard of distant simultaneity; a temporal metric on the quotient of spacetime by the
foliation; and a spatial metric on the quotient of spacetime by the bration.
13Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the actual universe is Newtonian.
14 In his correspondence with Clarke (Alexander, 1956), Leibniz is sometimes read as oering
kinematic-shi arguments somewhat dierent to the one just sketched.e idea is that kinematically-
shied possible worlds would violate the Principle of Sucient Reason (PSR) and the Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). Since these principles are a priori true, according to Leibniz, there can
be no such plurality of possibilities. A ‘Leibnizian’ argument from the PSR would ask us to consider
what reasons God could have had for creating the actual universe rather than one of its kinematically-
shied cousins. An argument from the PII would claim that, since kinematically-shied worlds are
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e conclusion of this section is that the Galilean invariance of Newtonian
physics poses something of an interpretative dilemma. On the one hand, to make
sense of the successful dynamical laws it seems that we have to acknowledge more
spacetime structure than the Leibnizian relationalist is prepared to countenance. On
the other hand, Newton’s manner of securing a suciently rich structure introduces
more than is strictly required and therefore underwrites empirically undetectable yet
allegedly genuine quantities. Absent an alternative way to make sense of Newtonian
physics, one might learn to live with Newton’s metaphysics. However, the irritant
of absolute velocities motivates a search for an alternative. In the next section,
I consider a substantivalist way out of the dilemma. Relationalist strategies are
explored in Section 6.
4 Spacetime Substantivalism
4.1 Neo-Newtonian spacetime
e substantivalist can do away with unwanted absolute velocities by adopting the
essentially four-dimensional perspective aorded by spacetime. In this framework,
there is an elegant way of characterising a spatiotemporal structure that might seem
to be neither too weak nor too strong for Newtonian physics.15e dynamical quan-
tities of classical mechanics presuppose the simultaneity structure, instantaneous
Euclidean geometry and temporal metric common to the Leibnizian relationalist
and the Newtonian substantivalist.ey additionally require some extra transtempo-
ral structure. Geometrically, what’s needed is a standard of straightness for paths in
spacetime (provided in dierential geometry by an ane connection).e possible
trajectories of ideal force-free bodies correspond to those straight lines in spacetime
that do not lie within surfaces of simultaneity.ese straight lines fall into families
of non-intersecting lines that ll spacetime. Each family of lines are the trajectories
observationally indistinguishable, they directly violate the PII.
Neither argument is convincing (nor is either faithful to Leibniz; see Pooley (unpublished)).e
sense of indiscernbility relevant to kinematic shis is not that which has been the focus of contem-
porary discussion of the PII.is takes two entities to be indiscernible just if they share all their
(qualitative) properties. In general, two kinematically-shied worlds do dier qualitatively; given
how the qualitative/nonqualitiative distinction is standardly understood, a body’s absolute speed is a
qualitative property, and dierences in absolute velocity are (typically) qualitative dierences. Such
qualitative dierences are empirically inaccessible but, theoretically, they could ground a reason
for an all-seeing God’s preference for one possibility over another. A PSR dilemma for God is
created if we consider kinematically-shied worlds that dier, not in terms of the magnitude of
their objects’ absolute velocities, but only over their directions.ese are worlds that are qualita-
tively indistinguishable. Discussion of how the substantivalist should treat these is postponed until
Section 7.
15In fact, it is too strong; see Section 6.1 below.
11
of the points of the ‘space’ of some inertial frame.e resulting spacetime is known
as Galilean or neo-Newtonian spacetime (see, e.g., Sklar, 1974, 202–6; Earman, 1989,
33).
Now, it is one thing to give a non-redundant characterisation of the spacetime
structure that Newtonian mechanics assumes. It is another to provide a satisfactory
account of its metaphysical foundations (i.e., of what, in reality, underwrites this
structure).e obvious option is to take the unitary notion of spacetime (rather
than space and time separately) ontologically seriously. One regards spacetime as
something that exists in its own right and which literally has the geometric structure
that the ane connection, amongst other things, encodes. In terms of such ontology,
one can provide a metaphysical account of the distinction between absolute and
relative motion in a way that respects the physical equivalence of inertial frames.
It will facilitate comparison with relativistic theories to introduce a formulation
of Newton mechanics that makes explicit reference to this geometrical structure.
In abstract terms, physical theories oen have the following general form. A space
K of kinematically possible models (KPMs) is rst specied.e job of the theory’s
equations (which relate the quantities in terms of which the KPMs are characterised)
is then to single out the subspace S ofK containing the dynamically possible models
(DPMs).16e KPMs can be thought of as representing the range of metaphysical
possibilities consistent with the theory’s basic ontological assumptions.e DPMs
represent a narrower set of physical possibilities.
In a coordinate-dependent formulation of Newtonian theory like that so far
considered, the KPMs might be sets of inextendible smooth curves in R4 which are
nowhere tangent to surfaces of constant t (where (t, x⃗) ∈ R4).e models assign
to the curves various parameters (m, . . .). Under the intended interpretation, the
curves represent possible trajectories of material particles, described with respect to
a canonical coordinate system, and the parameters represent various dynamically
relevant particle properties, such as mass.e space of DPMs consists of those sets
of curves that satisfy the standard form of Newton’s equations.
In the local spacetime formulation of the theory, one takes the KPMs to be
n-tuples of the form ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , Φ1, Φ2, . . .⟩.17 M is a four-dimensional dier-
entiable manifold and tab , hab and ∇a are geometric-object elds onM that encode,
respectively, the temporal structure (both the simultaneity surfaces and the temporal
16ese notions are standard, although terminology varies; see, e.g., Anderson (1967, 74) and
Friedman (1983, 48).
17A locus classicus in the philosophical literature for a discussion of Newtonian theory formulated
in this style is Friedman (1983, Ch. III). I adopt the following widespread notational conventions:
Roman indices from the start of the alphabet do not denote components—they are “abstract indices”
merely indicating the type of geometric-object eld; Greek indices denote that the components of
the objects relative to some spacetime coordinate system are being considered; repeated indices
indicate a sum over those indices (the Einstein summation convention).
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metric), the Euclidean geometry of instantaneous space and the inertial structure
(i.e., which paths in spacetime are straight). Together they represent neo-Newtonian
spacetime.e “matter elds” Φi , which represent thematerial content of themodel,
can be curves (maps from the real line intoM, representing particle trajectories)
or elds (maps fromM into some space of possible values, either encoding force
potentials or continuous matter distributions).
e theory’s DPMs are picked out by a set of equations that relate these various
objects. Some of these will involve both the spacetime structure and the matter
elds. For example, Newton’s second law becomes:
Fa = mξn∇nξa . (N2)
For those not familiar with the tensor notation, the essential points to note about
this equation are the following. Fa and ξa are spacetime four-vectors. Fa stands for
the four-force on the particle. As in more traditional formulations of Newtonian
theories, it will be specied by one or more additional equations. ξa is the four-
velocity of the particle; it is the tangent vector to the particle’s spacetime trajectory
if that trajectory has been parameterised by absolute time.18 Note, in particular,
the explicit appearance of ∇a in the equation. ξn∇nξa is the four-acceleration of
the particle; it characterises how the particle’s trajectory deviates from the adjacent
tangential straight line in spacetime (i.e., from the relevant inertial trajectory).
4.2 Symmetries Revisited
In Section 3 the Galilei group and the Leibniz group were introduced as sets of coor-
dinate transformations, and the dynamical symmetries of Newtonian mechanics
were characterised in terms of the form invariance of its equations. We now see
that the implementation of this approach is not completely straightforward: various
formulations of Newtonian mechanics involve dierent sets of equations, and these
can have dierent invariance properties. In particular, when Newton’s laws are re-
cast so as to make explicit reference to the geometrical structure of neo-Newtonian
spacetime, the resulting equations are either generally covariant (they hold with
respect to a set coordinate systems related by smooth but otherwise arbitrary coor-
dinate transformations) or they are coordinate-independent (they directly equate
certain geometrical objects, rather than the values of the objects’ components in
some coordinate system).
ere is an alternative way to characterise the symmetries of a spacetime theory.
Rather than focusing on the theory’s equations, one considers their solutions. Sup-
pose, now, that a group G of maps from spacetime to itself has a natural action on
18I.e., the trajectory is parametrized so that ta ξa = 1, where ta is a one-form related to the temporal
metric via tab = ta tb .
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the space of KPMs. G is a symmetry of the theory if and only if it xes the solution
space S.19 Note the need to relativise this characterisation of symmetry to groups
of maps from spacetime to itself. If we were allowed to consider any action of any
group on the space of KPMs, the requirement that S be xed would be too easily
satised. In particular, for any two points s1, s2 in S, we could nd a group action
on the space of KPMs such that S is xed and s1 is mapped to s2. I.e., every point in
S would be mapped to every other by some symmetry transformation or other.20
If the KPMs and DPMs of Newtonian mechanics are dened according to the
rst formulation above (as certain classes of curves in R4), the symmetry group
of the theory turns out, as one might have expected, to be the Galilei group.is
is not so if the local spacetime formulation of the theory is adopted. e space
of KPMs then carries an action of the dieomorphism group Di(M): for any⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , Φi⟩ ∈K and for any d ∈ Di(M), ⟨M , d∗tab , d∗hab , d∗∇a , d∗Φi⟩ ∈
K.21 It follows from the tensorial nature of the equations that pick out the so-
lution subspace that, if ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , Φi⟩ satises the equations then so does⟨M , d∗tab , d∗hab , d∗∇a , d∗Φi⟩ (Earman and Norton, 1987, 520). In other words,
the full group Di(M) xes S and therefore counts as a symmetry group of this
formulation of the theory.
At this point it might look as if the formulation-dependence that aicts a
denition of dynamical symmetries in terms of the invariance of equations has
simply been reproduced at the level of models. We can, however, reintroduce the
distinction between spacetime and dynamical symmetries in model-theoretic terms.
Our characterisation of the models of a local spacetime formulation of Newtonian
mechanics involved distinguishing those geometric-object elds onM that represent
spacetime structure from those that represent the material content of spacetime.
Let’s write ⟨M ,A1, . . . ,An , P1, . . . , Pm⟩ for a generic spacetime model, where the
Ais stand for the elds that represent spacetime structure and the Pjs stand for
the elds that represent the matter content. Recall that the coordinate-dependent
denition of spacetime symmetries given in Section 3 required that the encoding
19In general, an action of group G on a spaceK is a function ϕ ∶ (g , k) ∈ G ×K↦ g ⋅ k ∈K such
that, for all g , h ∈ G and k ∈K, g ⋅(h ⋅ k) = (gh) ⋅ k and e ⋅ k = k, where e is the identity element ofG.
To avoid triviality, we should also require that the action is faithful, i.e., that for any g, if g ⋅ k = k for
all k, g = e. G is a symmetry group if and only if g ⋅ s ∈ S for all g ∈ G and s ∈ S.e symmetry group
of a theory characterised in this way is referred to as the theory’s covariance group by Anderson
(1967, 75).
20See Gordon Belot’s chapter in this volume for further discussion.
21e dieomorphism group Di(M) is the group of all dierentiable one-one mappings from
M onto itself.e denition of the map d∗, which acts on geometrical objects onM and is induced
by the manifold mapping d ∶ p ∈ M ↦ dp ∈ M, will depend on the type of eld. For a scalar eld, ϕ,
d∗ϕ(dp) ∶= ϕ(p).e action of d∗ on scalar elds can then be used to dene its action on tensor
elds. For example, for the vector eld V , we require that d∗V(d∗ϕ)∣d p = V(ϕ)∣p for all points p
and scalar elds ϕ.
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of spacetime structure by the coordinate system was preserved. Analogously, we
can identify a theory’s spacetime symmetry group as the set of elements of Di(M)
that are automorphisms of the spacetime structure; i.e., we require that d∗Ai = Ai
for each eld Ai .22 In the case of our Newtonian theory, the proper subgroup of
Di(M) that leaves each of tab , hab and ∇a invariant is the Galilei group.
An alternative method of singling out a subgroup of Di(M) focuses on the
matter elds rather than the spacetime structure elds. Typically the matter content
of a solution will have no non-trivial automorphisms and, if it does, there will be
other solutions whose matter content does not share these symmetries. We can,
however, ask whether a dieomorphism acting solely on the matter elds maps
solutions to solutions. In other words, we pick out a subgroup of Di(M) via the
requirement that (for a given choice of Ai) for all ⟨M ,Ai , Pj⟩ ∈ S, ⟨M ,Ai , d∗Pj⟩
should also be in S.23 Note that, in this denition, d acts only on thematter elds and
not on the spacetime structure elds.e subgroup of dieomorphisms with this
property is sometimes identied as a theory’s dynamical symmetry group (Earman,
1989, 45–6). Again, in the spacetime formulation of Newtonian theory set in neo-
Newtonian spacetime, if this group turns out to be the Galilei group one has a
perfect match between the spacetime symmetry group and the dynamical symmetry
group.24
e model-theoretic perspective supports the idea that the problems faced by
both the Leibnizian relationalist and the Newtonian substantivalist involve mis-
matches between these two symmetry groups. Whenever the spacetime symmetry
group is a proper subset of the dynamical symmetry group, the theory will admit
non-isomorphic models whose material submodels are nevertheless isomorphic.
(Such models will be related by dynamical symmetries that are not also spacetime
symmetries.) is will give rise to supposedly meaningful yet physically undis-
coverable quantities: models will dier over some quantities in virtue of dierent
relations of matter to spacetime structure and yet (assuming the material content of
the models encompasses all that is observable) such dierences will be undetectable.
is is exactly the situation of the Newtonian substantivalist, who postulates a richer
22 More carefully, the requirement that d∗A i = A i for each A i picks out a specic subgroup of
Di(M) relative to a particular choice of A i . Suppose that ⟨M ,A i , Pj⟩ and ⟨M ,A′i , P′j⟩ are both
models of our theory and that there is a dieomorphism ϕ ∶ M → M such that A′i = ϕ∗A i for each
A i ,A′i (all models of a theory set in Galilean spacetime will have this property). Although it will not
be true, in general, that {d ∈ Di(M) ∶ d∗A i = A i} = {d′ ∈ Di(M) ∶ d′∗A′i = A′i}, the groups will
be isomorphic to the same (abstract) group; cf. Earman (1989, 45).
23As noted in footnote 22, dierent choices of A i will, strictly speaking, yield distinct subgroups
of Di(M) but (for well-behaved theories) these will simply correspond to dierent representations
of the same abstract group.
24e dynamical symmetry group of Newtonian theory set in neo-Newtonian spacetime in fact
turns out to be a larger group if the theory incorporates gravitation in a eld-theoretic way. See
pp 31 below.
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spacetime structure than that of neo-Newtonian spacetime. Models related by
Galilean boosts of their material content dier over undetectable absolute velocities.
e mismatch faced by the Leibnizian relationalist is of the opposite kind: the
Galilei group is a proper subset of the Leibniz group. Strictly speaking, this is not
a case where the dynamical symmetry group of some theory is smaller than the
spacetime symmetry group. For that we would need a spacetime formulation of
a theory that (i) was set in so-called Leibnizian spacetime and (ii) had the Galilei
group as its dynamical symmetry group (e.g., in virtue of an isomorphism between
the set of its matter submodels and those of standard Newtonian theory). But the
way in which the equations of the spacetime formulation of standard Newtonian
theory single out its matter submodels uses the full structure of neo-Newtonian
spacetime.e mismatch between the two groups is precisely what stands in the
way of constructing such a relational theory.
Before considering the spacetime substantivalist interpretation of relativistic
physics, a brief comment on the relation between the two formulations of Newtonian
mechanics that I have been discussing: I rst characterised the privileged coordinate
systems of the coordinate-dependent form of Newtonian physics as those adapted
to the spatiotemporal quantities recognised by the Newtonian. From this perspec-
tive, the spacetime formulation of the theory simply makes explicit structure that,
while implicit, is no less present in the coordinate-dependent, Galilean-covariant
formulation of the theory. Suppose one starts with (the coordinate expressions of)
the equations of the spacetime formulation of a Newtonian theory.ese equations
will be generally covariant. However, one can use the symmetries of the theory’s
spacetime structure to pick out a special class of coordinate systems in which the
values of the components of the elds representing the spacetime structure take on
constant or vanishing values. In these coordinate systems the otherwise generally
covariant equations apparently simplify. In other words, the Galilean covariant equa-
tions just are the generally covariant equations, written with respect to coordinate
systems that ‘hide’ the objects that represent spacetime structure.25
4.3 Relativistic Spacetimes
In the previous section, Imaintained that the geometrical structure of neo-Newtonian
spacetime featured, implicitly or otherwise, in the various formulations of classical
mechanics. A similar claim holds true for special relativity.is is most obvious in
25is might seem like a banal observation but I take it to be signicant because it conicts with
prevalent claims about the meaning of preferred coordinates in non-generally-covariant theories
made by, e.g., Rovelli (2004, 87–8) andWestman and Sonego (2009, 1952–3).eir conception of the
signicance of such coordinates implies that there is a dierence in kind between the observables
of non-covariant and generally covariant theories. On the view outlined above, there is no such
dierence.
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generally covariant or coordinate-free formulations of the equations of any specially
relativistic theory, where the Minkowski metric structure, encoded by the tensor
eld ηab, gures explicitly. But it is equally true of the ‘standard’ formulations of
the equations that hold true only relative to privileged inertial coordinate systems
related by Lorentz transformations. One can think of these coordinate systems as the
spacetime analogues of Cartesian coordinates on Euclidean space: the coordinate
intervals encode the spacetime distances via the condition (tp− tq)2−∣x⃗p− x⃗q∣2 = ∆s2.
Minkowski geometry is thus implicit in the standard formulation of the laws.
Because of the manner in which spacetime geometry features in the formulation
of the laws, substantivalists hold that it explains certain features of the phenomena
covered by those laws.26 Consider, for example, the “twin paradox” scenario. Of
two initially synchronized clocks, one remains on Earth while the other performs a
round trip at near the speed of light. On its return the travelling clock has ticked
away less time than the stay-at-home clock. e geometrical facts behind this
phenomenon are straightforward: the inertial trajectory of the stay-at-home clock
is simply a longer timelike path than the trajectory of the travelling clock. Note
that the substantivalist does not simply assert that the number of a clock’s ticks is
proportional to the spacetime distance along its trajectory. Clocks are complicated
systems the parts of which obey various (relativistic) laws. One should look to these
laws for a complete understanding of why the ‘ticks’ of such a system will indeed
correspond to equal temporal intervals of the system’s trajectory. But since, for the
substantivalist, these laws make (implicit or explicit) reference to independently
real geometric structure, an explanation that appeals to the laws will, in part, be
an explanation in terms of such geometric structure, postulated as a fundamental
feature of reality.
Soon aer formulating his special theory of relativity, Einstein began a decade-
long quest for a theory of gravitation that was compatible with the new notions of
space and time.e triumphant culmination of this eort was his publication of
the eld equations of his general theory of relativity (GR) in 1915.27ese equations,
known as the Einstein Field Equations (EFEs), relate certain aspects of the curva-
ture of spacetime, as encoded in the Einstein tensor, Gab, to the matter content of
26Nerlich (1979, 2010) is staunch advocate of the explanatory role of the geometry of spacetime,
realistically construed. He classies the role of physical geometry in such explanations as non-causal,
but, on certain plausible understandings of causation (e.g., Lewis, 2000), it does count as causal (see
also Mellor, 1980).
27e genesis of Einstein’s general theory has been subject to extensive historical and philosophical
scrutiny. For an excellent introduction to the topic, see Janssen (2008).
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spacetime, as encoded in the energy momentum tensor, Tab:28
Gab = 8piTab . (EFE)
One goal above all others guided Einstein’s search: the generalization of the
‘special’ principle of relativity to a principle that upheld the equivalence of frames of
reference in arbitrary states of relative motion. In this, Einstein was motivated by
the belief that the role of primitive inertial structure in explaining phenomena in
both Newtonian physics and in special relativity was “epistemologically suspect”:
real eects, he believed, should be traceable to observable, material causes.
In the early stages of his search, Einstein had a crucial insight, which he thought
would play a key role in the implementation of a generalised relativity principle.
According to his Principle of Equivalence, an inertial frame in which there is a
uniform gravitational eld is physically equivalent to a uniformly accelerating frame
in which there is no gravitational eld. It is not hard to see why one might take
this principle to extend the principle of relativity from uniform motion to uniform
acceleration.29
When Einstein rst published the eld equations of GR, he believed that their
general covariance ensured that they implemented a general principle of relativity.
Since smooth but otherwise arbitrary coordinate transformations include transfor-
mations between coordinate systems adapted to frames in arbitrary relative motion,
it might seem that there can be no privileged frames of reference in a generally
covariant theory. Almost immediately, Kretschmann (1917) pointed out that this
cannot be correct, arguing that it should be possible to recast any physical theory in
generally covariant form.
Compared to its predecessors, GR is without doubt a very special theory. But one
will do more justice to its conceptual novelty, not less, by seeking as much common
ground with previous theories as possible. We have already met generally covariant
formulations of Newtonian and specially relativistic physics. As these examples
attest, Kretschmann’s instincts were sound and it is now well understood that the
general covariance of GR does not implement a general principle of relativity. In
fact, GR arguably includes privileged frames of reference in much the same way as
pre-relativistic theories.30
28 Gab ∶= Rab − 1⁄2Rgab , where Rab (the Ricci tensor) and R (the Riemann curvature scalar) are
both measures of curvature. gab is themetric tensor and encodes all facts about the spatiotemporal
distances between spacetime points. Rab and R are ocially dened in terms of the Riemann tensor,
itself dened in terms of the connection ∇a . However, since we are considering the unique torsion-
free, metric-compatible connection, we can view these quantities as dened in terms of the metric
and, indeed, they can be given natural geometric interpretations directly in terms of spacetime
distances. Tab encodes the net energy, stress and momentum densities associated with the material
elds in spacetime.
29For a critical discussion of Einstein’s various formulations of the principle, see Norton (1985).
30I should note that some still hold out against this orthodoxy (e.g. Dieks, 2006).
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It is illuminating to consider a concrete example. Compare the local spacetime
formulation of specially relativistic electromagnetism to its generally relativistic
version. Models of the former are of the form ⟨M , ηab , Fab , Ja⟩, where ηab encodes
the Minkowski spacetime distances between the points ofM, the covariant tensor
eld Fab represents the electromagnetic eld and the vector eld Ja represents the
charge current density.e dynamically possible models can be picked out via the
coordinate-free form of Maxwell’s equations:
∇aFab = −4piJb∇[aFbc] = 0 (Maxwell)
e only dierence between this theory and the generally relativistic theory is that,
in the latter, the Minkowski metric ηab is replaced by a variably curved Lorentzian
metric eld, gab. Maxwell’s equations remain as constraints on the DPMs of the GR
version, and the same relativistic version of Newton’s second law (which is formally
identical to the non-relativistic version—equation (N2)—given on page 13 above)
holds in both theories.31 But, whereas the specially relativistic metric was stipulated
to be at, to be physically possible according to GR, combinations of gab, Fab and Ja
must now obey the EFEs.
In the case of SR, the standard, Lorentz-invariant form of Maxwell’s equations
are recovered by choosing inertial coordinate systems adapted to the spacetime
distances.32e only reason that the same cannot be said of GR is that the pattern of
spacetime distances catalogued by gab does not allow for global coordinate systems
that encode them. One can, however, always chose a coordinate system that is
optimally adapted the spacetime distances in the innitesimal neighbourhood of
any point p ∈ M. In any coordinate system in which, at p, gµν = diag(1,−1,−1,−1)
and gµν,γ = 0, the laws governing matter elds will take their standard Lorentz-
invariant form at p.
It is in terms of this strong equivalence principle that the phenomena that gure in
Einstein’s original principle are nowadays understood.33 From amodern perspective,
apparent “gravitational elds” have precisely the same status as the potentials that
give rise to the centrifugal and coriolis forces in Newtonian physics: they correspond
to pseudo forces that are artefacts of the failure of the relevant coordinate systems
to be fully adapted to the true geometry of spacetime.e “force” that holds us on
the surface of the Earth and the “force” pinning the astronaut to the oor of the
31In this case, the four-force on a particle with charge q and four-velocity ξa is given by qFab ξ
b
and the equation is simply the coordinate-free version of the Lorentz force law.
32For example, the components of Fab relative to an inertial coordinate system are F0i = −E i , Fi j =
є i jkBk , where E i and B i are the components of the electric and magnetic three-vector elds in that
frame.
33Ehlers (1973b, 18); see Brown (2005, 169–72) for a recent discussion.
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accelerating rocket ship are literally of one and the same kind. In GR, gravitational
phenomena are not understood as resulting from the action of forces.34
5 Reasons to be a Relationalist?
We have seen that substantivalism is recommended by a rather straightforward
realist interpretation of our best physics. is physics presupposes geometrical
structure that it is natural to interpret as primitive and physically instantiated in
an entity ontologically independent of matter. Although I have only considered
non-quantum physics explicitly, the claim is equally true of both non-relativistic
and relativistic quantum theories (Weinstein, 2001). One might therefore wonder:
why even try to be a relationalist? For some, the Hole Argument, discussed below in
Section 7, is the major reason to seek an alternative to substantivalism. Here I wish
to review some other antisubstantivalist themes that have motivated relationalists.
e conclusion will be that the only strong consideration in favour of relationalism
is Ockham’s razor: if a plausible relational interpretation of empirically adequate
physics can be devised, then the standard reasons for postulating the substantivalist’s
additional ontology are undermined.
5.1 A Failure of Rationality?
In Section 6.2 I review Julian Barbour’s approach to dynamics. According to Barbour,
there is something “irrational” about standard Newtonian mechanics. Barbour sets
up the problem in terms of the data required for the Newtonian initial value problem:
given the equations of a Newtonian theory, what quantities must be specied at an
instant in order to x a solution? Following Poincaré, Barbour emphasises that the
natural relational data—instantaneous relative distances and their rst derivatives—
are almost but not quite enough. In addition, three further parameters, which
specify the magnitude and direction of the angular momentum of the entire system,
34Some authors favour talk of “tidal forces” or state that there is a real “gravitational eld” just
where the Riemann tensor is non-zero (e.g. Synge, 1960, IX). As far as I can see, this is simply a
misleading way of talking about spacetime curvature and (typically) nothing of conceptual substance
is intended by it. For a discussion of some of the pros and cons of identifying various geometrical
structures with the “gravitational eld”, see Lehmkuhl (2008, 91-8). Lehmkuhl regards the metric
gab as the best candidate. My own view is that consideration of the Newtonian limit (e.g. Misner
et al., 1973, 445–6) favours a candidate not on his list, viz. deviation of the metric from atness:
hab , where gab = ηab + hab . at this split is not precisely dened and does not correspond to
anything fundamental in classical GR underscores the point that, in GR, talk of the “gravitational
eld” is at best unhelpful and at worst confused. e distinction between background geometry
and the graviton modes of the quantum eld propagating against that geometry is fundamental
to perturbative string theory, but this is a feature that one might hope will not survive in a more
fundamental “background-independent” formulation.
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are needed.35 Barbour claims that there is something odd about this fact (see, e.g.,
Barbour, 2011, §2.2).
Fixing the Euclidean relative distances between N particles and their rates of
change requires the specication of 6N − 12 numbers; 6N numbers are required to
specify their positions and velocities in absolute space.e Newtonian initial value
problem, however, requires 6N − 9 numbers. Six of the 6N numbers that specify
the particles’ absolute positions and velocities can be thought of as specifying the
orientation of the system as a whole and the position of its centre of mass. States
that dier solely in terms of these quantities only dier non-qualitatively, in terms
of which particular points of space are related to the material system in (qualitative)
ways common to both situations; the structural pattern of relations between space
and matter is shared by both states. Even if such dierences are to be regarded
as real dierences (something to be questioned in Section 7), Newtonian physics
should not be expected to take them into account (pace Barbour, 1999, 83). It does
not, aer all, single out particular points of space by name.e remaining three
parameters can be thought of as specifying the absolute velocity of the centre ofmass.
As we have seen, while the Newtonian substantivalist regards this as a genuinely
qualitative matter, the spacetime substantivalist does away with these quantities by
embracing neo-Newtonian spacetime. Arguably, 6N − 9 numbers is precisely what
the spacetime substantivalist should expect to be needed as Newtonian initial data.
What, then, is “irrational” about Newtonian mechanics? In Barbour’s view it
fails to be maximally predictive: relative to the Leibnizian data, there is an apparent
breakdown of determinism, which is only restored by specifying the global angular
momentum. At one level, this simply amounts to a prejudice in favour of the
relational quantities over the Newtonian ones. For Barbour, this preference is based
on the fact that it is the relational quantities that are “directly observable” (see,
e.g., Barbour, 2010, 1280) but (i) direct observability is an extreme criterion for
determining ontological commitment and (ii) instantaneous relative distances are
not directly observable.36 One can still agree with Barbour’s less ambitious point.
Without agreeing that there is something inherently objectionable about standard
Newtonian theory, one might nevertheless prefer a theory that does as well (is at
least as explanatory etc.) but with fewer resources. Barbour’s observations about
initial data highlight that, if an adequate relational theory of the envisaged type can
35Instantaneous relative distances and their rst derivatives are the natural Leibnizian relational
data. As reviewed in Section 6.2, Barbour’s preferred framework for understanding classical me-
chanics also dispenses with a primitive temporal metric and an absolute length scale. With respect
to these more frugal initial data, ve, not three, additional numbers are needed. See Barbour (2011,
§2.2).
36Nor are distance ratios, Barbour’s preferred relational quantities. For an illuminating discussion
of how instantaneous quantities are detected only indirectly, in measurements that necessarily take
nite time, see Stein (1991, 157).
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be found, it will be more predictive, because its initial data form a proper subset of
those of the Newtonian theory.
5.2 e Spacetime Explanation of Inertia
In Section 6.3 I consider the dynamical approach to special relativity, defended in
Brown (2005) and Brown and Pooley (2006). I noted above that substantivalists
view the postulated spacetime geometry as explanatory. Brown is suspicious of this
doctrine. In assessing it, the putative explanatory roles of ane structure and of
metric structure should be treated separately. Here I only consider the former; the
latter is discussed in Section 6.3.
e idea that ane structure plays a quasi-causal role in explaining the motions
of bodies gures signicantly in Einstein’s criticism of Newtonian mechanics and
SR and in his subsequent understanding of GR. Consider Einstein’s example from
his early review paper on GR, of two uid bodies separated by a great distance and
in relative rotation about the line joining their centres. e two are of the same
size, shape and nature except that one body is spherical whereas as the other is
oblate. In Newtonian mechanics the explanation of this dierence is that the oblate
body, but not the spherical body, is rotating with respect to the inertial frames:
the absolute rotation of the oblate body causes its oblateness. Einstein labels the
Newtonian spacetime structure with respect to which such rotation is dened as
a “merely factitious cause” of the dierence; he held that a genuine explanation
should instead cite another “observable fact of experience” (Einstein, 1916, 112–3).
He initially maintained that this requirement was met in GR because he believed
that the theory satised what he later calledMach’s Principle (Einstein, 1918, 241–2):
if the metric eld gab were fully determined by the distribution of matter throughout
the universe, then the dierence between the inertial behaviour of the two bodies
would be traceable to dierences in their relations to distant (observable) masses.
As Einstein soon recognised, GR does not satisfy Mach’s Principle so dened.37
Inertial structure, as encoded in gab, is inuenced but not determined by the mat-
ter content of spacetime.38 Einstein ceased to regard the eld describing inertial
structure as having a secondary status relative to ponderable matter. By 1921, the
objection to Newtonian absolute space was no longer that it was invisible. Instead
37De Sitter rst pointed out to Einstein that, in addition to specication of Tab , one needs to
specify boundary conditions at innity in order to determine gab .is prompted Einstein to search
for spatially compact solutions to the EFEs and to introduce the cosmological constant to allow for a
static, spatially closed universe.is in turn led de Sitter to the discovery of the de Sitter universe: a
spatially compact vacuum solution to the modied EFEs. See Janssen (2008, §5) for a summary of
this episode and for further references.
38It is also worth stressing that the stress-energy properties of matter, as encoded in Tab , cannot
even be dened independently of gab ; see Lehmkuhl (2011).
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the fact that it acted without being acted upon was held up as problematic; a ‘defect’
not shared by the spacetimes of GR (Einstein, 1922, 61–2).39 At around the same
time, Weyl advocated a similar conception of the role of inertial structure (he called
it the “guiding eld”), which he regarded as “physically real” in both pre-relativistic
physics and in GR (Weyl, 1922, §27).
What does Brown object to in this picture? Consider the “conspiracy of inertia”:
the relatively simple case of the force-free motions of a collection of Newtonian
particles (Brown, 2005, 15, 141). Despite the fact that, ex hypothesi, the particles
are not inuencing one another, they move in a highly coordinated way: there are
spacetime coordinate systems with respect to which all the trajectories are straight
lines.40 As we have seen, the coordinate-free geometrical description of this state
of aairs regards the trajectories as coinciding with the straight lines of an ane
connection on spacetime, the atness of which allows for the global inertial coordi-
nate systems in terms of which the phenomenon was stated. For the substantivalist,
inertial structure is an element of reality that exists independently of the particles
and their motions. On this view, aspects of the geometry play a role in explaining
the phenomenon because, as stated in the substantivalist version of Newton’s rst
law, the particles’ trajectories are constrained as a matter of physical necessity to
be aligned with features of this realistically construed geometry. For Brown, this is
merely verbal pseudo-explanation. His preferred point of view reverses the arrow
of explanation: the geometry is just a codication of the phenomenon, which (in
pre-relativistic physics) must be taken as primitive.
If the only role of inertial structure was to explain pure inertial motion, Brown’s
complaint against the substantivalist would have some intuitive force; a at ane
connection could be thought of as a rather direct codication of the regularities
manifest in the phenomena via the “coordinative denition” of spacetime geodesics
as the trajectories of force-free bodies.41 Explaining inertial motion, though, is
39e idea that something should be capable of acting if and only if it can also be aected by those
things that it can inuence is known as the action–reaction principle (see Anandan and Brown, 1995,
for a discussion).
40I.e., there are coordinate systems with respect to which the particles’ spatial coordinates are
linear functions of their time coordinates. In Brown’s view, “anyone who is not amazed by this
conspiracy has not understood it” (Brown, 2005, 15).
41e idea that spacetime geodesics are dened as the trajectories of force-free bodies is defended
by DiSalle (1995, 327), whom Brown quotes approvingly. Elsewhere Brown, ostensibly to make a
point against the substantivalist explanation of inertia, stresses that the principle that the trajectories
of force-free bodies are geodesics in fact has limited validity in GR (Brown, 2005, 141, see also
161–8). What this observation in fact undermines is a relationalist approach to spacetime geometry
that tries to dene geodesics in terms of “basic physical laws” (DiSalle, 1995, 325). More recently,
DiSalle makes clear that he diers from the logical positivists in not regarding the coordination of
geodesics with free-fall trajectories as a matter of arbitrary stipulation. Instead it is said to be “a kind
of discovery, at once physical and mathematical, that. . . the only objectively distinguishable state of
motion corresponds to the only geometrically distinctive path in a generally covariant geometry”
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not the real purpose of inertial structure. Inertial structure gures centrally in the
explanation of noninertialmotion. In contrast to the force-free case, the sequence of
relative distances between interacting particles manifest over time in a Newtonian
universe displays no obvious regularity. It is a rather remarkable fact that, by postu-
lating a highly symmetric geometrical structure in terms of which the motions of
individual particles are to be understood, one can provide an elegant explanation,
in terms of simple force laws, of the complicated and irregular history of relational
quantities. Anyone who is not amazed by this conspiracy has not understood it.
Since the postulated deep structure is not manifest in the surface phenomena it
seems genuinely explanatory and not a mere codication. It is from an application
of standard inference-to-the-best-explanation reasoning to this type of scenario
that substantivalism gets its real support.42
Brown suggests that, around 1927, Einstein ceased to assign a quasi-casual role to
spacetime in determining the inertial trajectories of bodies (Brown, 2005, 161).e
alleged reason is that, at this time, Einstein came to recognise that the principle of
inertia does not need to be postulated as a basic law in GR; it is instead a theorem.43
In Brown’s view this fact undermines the idea that spacetime structure “in and of
itself ” acts “directly” on force-free bodes because it shows that, in GR, when such
bodies undergo geodesic motion, “such motion is ultimately due to the way the
Einstein eld gµν couples to matter, as determined by the eld equations” (Brown,
2005, 162–3). Brown’s picture is, then, that the relationship of the motions of force-
free bodies to inertial structure in GR is radically dierent to this relationship
in Newtonian physics and SR. In the latter theories, inertial structure is a mere
codication of basic, mysterious inertial behaviour. In the former, it receives a
dynamical explanation via the coupling of matter elds to the metric, as described
by the EFEs.
e substantivalist should not be especially troubled by Brown’s claim, for it
concedes that, in our best (classical) theory of spacetime, the metric structure of
spacetime is a primitive element of reality that plays a role in determining the
inertial behaviour of bodies. Even so, there are reasons to doubt that the contrast
between GR and pre-relativistic theories can really bear the weight Brown demands
of it.e derivation of geodesic motion from the EFEs basically involves two steps.
First, one notes that the EFEs imply the vanishing of the covariant divergence of the
(DiSalle, 2006, 131–2). Nothing in the substantivalist’s metaphysics is inconsistent with this position;
it is less clear what other metaphysical views are compatible with it. DiSalle does not share the
substantivalist’s and relationalist’s preoccupation with ontological questions but nor does he oer
reasons to see such questions as illegitimate.
42Note that Einstein had in mind descriptions of interacting systems in dierent states of accelera-
tion, and not simple inertial motion, when he claimed “that something real has to be conceived as
the cause for the preference of an inertial system over a noninertial system” (Einstein, 1924, 16).
43See Malament (2010) for a critical discussion of this result.
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stress energy tensor: ∇aTab = 0. Secondly, one makes various assumptions about
the nature of the stress-energy tensor to be associated with a force-free particle
that, together with the vanishing of the divergence of stress-energy, can be shown
to entail that the particle’s trajectory is a geodesic. Now, the second step of this
derivation is as applicable in SR as in GR.44What dierence there is between the
theories must therefore concern the status of the conservation principle, ∇aTab = 0.
is equation, of course, also holds in SR. Further, while in SR it cannot be derived
from the gravitational eld equations (there are none), it is a consequence of the
matter eld equations (as it is in GR also).45
In sum, geodesic motion is arguably as much a theorem in SR as it is in GR.
An alternative perspective to Brown’s is that the “dynamical coupling” of matter
elds to inertial structure is in essential respects the same in GR and pre-relativistic
theories. It is true that the geodesic theorem also demonstrates that it has limited
validity in GR but not in SR (recall footnote 41). But the reason why, e.g., rotating
bodies do not deviate from geodesics in SR is not that the relationship between
realistically-construed inertial structure and matter is radically dierent in this
theory to that in GR.e reason is simply that, in SR, there is no curvature to which
rotating bodies might couple.46
Wehave yet tomeet a decisive reason to look for an alternative to substantivalism.
Huggett, whose “regularity account” of relational spacetime I consider in Section 6.3,
states that his reasons for advocating relationalism are the usual ones: “worries about
‘Leibniz shis’ and considerations of ontological parsimony that militate against the
introduction of bizarre non-material substances” (Huggett, 2006, 41).e kinematic
shi has already been dealt with; other Leibniz shis are discussed in Section 7. It is
not clear why Huggett regards spacetime as “bizarre”. In a pre-relativistic context,
one feature of spacetime that might seem odd is its failure, emphasised by Einstein,
to obey the action–reaction principle. As we have seen, however, if this is a failing, it
is not one shared by the spacetime of GR.at leaves considerations of ontological
parsimony: other things being equal, a relationalist interpretation of physics might
seem preferable to substantivalism because it makes do with fewer metaphysical
commitments.e question is: are other things equal? It is time to examine some
44A closely parallel derivation is also possible in the geometrized form of Newtonian gravity; see
Weatherall (2011a,b).is might be taken to further undermine the claim that only in GR is inertia
explained.
45See, e.g., Trautman (1962, 180–1).
46Brown’s thesis that inertia receives a dynamical explanation only in GR has recently been
defended by Sus (2011). Sus emphasises that in GR the metric is a genuinely dynamical entity and
that one can derive∇aT ab = 0 from the very equations that govern themetric’s behaviour. In contrast,
SR, as standardly conceived, involves xed inertial structure whose properties are postulated by
at. However, this dierence between the theories is compatible with the theories agreeing on the
fundamental reasons why force-free bodies are related to inertial structure in just the way they are.
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concrete relationalist proposals.
6 ree Varieties of Relationalism
Call the objects to whose existence a theory is committed the ontology of the theory.
Call the range of (primitive) distinctions that a theory is able to express via its
(primitive) predicates and terms—roughly, the set of (primitive) properties and
relations to which the theory is committed—the theory’s (primitive) ideology.47
In these terms, the problem faced by the Leibnizian relationalist is that classical
mechanics employs an ideology that appears to presuppose a substantivalist ontology.
Inertial structure is naturally understood in terms of relations that hold of spacetime
points; it cannot be understood (straightforwardly) in terms of properties and
relations that are instantiated only by material objects. On the other hand, bona
de relationalist ideology appears to be too impoverished a basis for an empirically
successful alternative to Newtonian theory.
is means that there are two obvious strategies open to relationalists. On the
rst, they can attempt to expand their ideology so that it underwrites the same
physical distinctions as substantivalist inertial structure but in a way compatible
with a relationalist ontology. To complete this programme, the relationalist then
needs to re-construe standard Newtonian theory in terms of these new relationalist
quantities.48 Variants of this strategy are the topic of Section 6.1. On the second
strategy, the relationalist seeks an alternative theory to Newtonian mechanics that
employs only traditional relationalist quantities but is, although empirically distinct
from Newtonian theory, nonetheless empirically adequate. Since the inertial frames
are empirically determinable (in our neighbourhood of this universe), such a theory
still needs to account for them, at least as a feature of solutions that could serve
as models of the actual world. Unlike theories that result from the rst strategy,
however, it will not construe them as encoding primitive spatiotemporal properties
and relations.emost promising version of this approach is reviewed in Section 6.2.
ese courses of action correspond closely to the rst two of three options
identied by Nick Huggett (1999). He sees Newton’s globes thought experiment as
illustrating that no theory has the following three characteristics. (i) Its spatiotempo-
ral ideology is restricted to Leibnizian relations; (ii) its dynamically allowed histories
of such relations are exactly those predicted by Newtonian theory and; (iii) inertial
eects supervene on the specied spatiotemporal relations between bodies. Strate-
47e terminology is Quine’s, who characterises a theory’s ontology as “the objects over which the
bound variables of the theory should be construed as ranging in order that the statements armed
in the theory be true” (Quine, 1951, 11).
48e need for this second step is emphasised by Earman (1989, 128), though not in precisely
these terms.
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gies (1) and (2) correspond to relinquishing (i) and (ii) respectively. But, Huggett
observes, the relationalist might try to retain (i) and (ii) by dropping requirement
(iii) (Huggett, 1999, 22–3). is amounts to a third, non-obvious strategy: don’t
change the theory and don’t add to the ideology and yet somehow be a relationalist.
is type of “have-it-all” relationalism is the topic of Section 6.3.
6.1 Enriched Relationalism
6.1.1 Classical Mechanics
Part of the substantivalist’s response to the kinematic shi argument involved re-
placing persisting space with spacetime. If relationalists likewise adopt a four-
dimensional perspective, a number of options richer than Leibnizian relationalism
become available.e most straightforward is Newtonian relationalism (Maudlin,
1993, 187). Whereas the Leibnizian relationalist posits spatial relations that hold only
between simultaneous material events, the Newtonian relationalist simply posits
that allmaterial point events stand in spatial distance relations.49
If we impose the natural constraints, the embedding of a Newtonian relational
history into neo-Newtonian spacetime is xed up to Galilean transformations.50
Whether this by itself entitles the relationalist to exploit the full resources of New-
tonian dynamics (as Maudlin thinks; 1993, 192–3) need not be resolved, for the
Newtonian relationalist can also interpret the dynamical laws directly in terms of
relationalist quantities. For example, the absolute velocity of particle i at time t is
just the limit, as δt goes to zero, of the directed distance between the instantaneous
stage of i at t and its instantaneous stage at t + δt divided by δt.e Newtonian
relationalist therefore has available a relational understanding of the very quantities
that feature in the standard form of Newtonian laws expressed with respect to an
inertial frame.
Unfortunately, Newtonian relationalism, like the Newtonian substantivalism
fromwhich its ideology is plundered, is vulnerable to the kinematic shi argument.51
49 Related versions of relationalism, according to which absolute velocity (or even absolute
position) is interpreted as a primitive,monadic property of particles, have been discussed byHorwich
(1978, 403) and Friedman (1983, 235) (see, also, Teller, 1987). In addition to being less natural than
the form of Newtonian relationalism identied by Maudlin, they are vulnerable (like Newtonian
relationalism) to the kinematic shi argument.e absolute position version is also vulnerable to
the static shi argument mentioned in Section 7.
50e obvious constraints are that the embedding respects the temporal separation between
material events and that there is a single congruence of inertial geodesics such that, for any two
material events e1 , e2 located on geodesics from the congruence v1 , v2, the Newtonian relational
distance between e1 and e2 equals the (constant) spatial distance between simultaneous points of v1
and v2.
51is is the principal inadequacy of Newtonian relationalism that Maudlin identies (1993, 193).
Friedman (1983, 235) makes the same criticism of the postulation of a primitive property of ‘absolute
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Since absolute velocities are unobservable, the Newtonian relationalist is committed
to physically real distinctions that are in principle empirically inaccessible. e
Newtonian relationalist must accept that, while only one inertial frame discloses
the true Newtonian relational distances, that frame is forever beyond our grasp.
e spacetime substantivalist solves the kinematic shi problem by replacing
Newtonian with neo-Newtonian spacetime.ere is an obvious relational analogue
of this move: since neo-Newtonian spacetime’s inertial structure is equivalent to a
relation of collinearity between triples of spacetime points, the relationalist can add
to their ideology a three-place relation of collinearity between material events.e
neo-Newtonian relationalist claims that, for three non-simultaneous events e1, e2, e3,
the relation col(e1, e2, e3) holds just if, from the substantivalist perspective, e1, e2
and e3 lie on a single inertial trajectory.52
e move solves the kinematic shi problem, but only at the cost of leaving the
relationalist’s ideology too impoverished to x the embedding of a relational history
into neo-Newtonian spacetime. An example of Maudlin’s nicely illustrates the point:
[C]onsider two particles in a neo-Newtonian spacetime that are uni-
formly rotating about their common center of mass. Until the rst
rotation is complete, no triple of occupied event locations are collinear.
Even aer any number of rotations, the collinearity relations among
occupied points will be consistent with any periodic rotation, uniform
or nonuniform. (Maudlin, 1993, 194)
One cannot, therefore, interpret the spacetime coordinates in which the dynam-
ical laws take their standard form as just those coordinates adapted to the neo-
Newtonian relationalist’s ideology; if the relationalist ontology is suciently sparse,
this ideology underdetermines the inertial frames.53
is kinematical underdetermination is not necessarily fatal to neo-Newtonian
relationalism. It means that the neo-Newtonian relationalist cannot simply lay
claim to standard Galilean-invariant dynamics. On the strategy we are considering,
velocity’.
52Maudlin restricts the extension of col to non-simultaneous events, but there is no reason why
mutually simultaneous events should not be included, with col(e1 , e2 , e3) holding just if the sum of
the distances between two of the pairs of events equals the distance between the third pair.
53A similar example involving Minkowski spacetime is discussed by Mundy (1986), Catton and
Solomon (1988) and Earman (1989, 168–9).e relations of spacelike separation, lightlike separation
and timelike separation determine the structure of Minkowski spacetime up to an overall scale
factor. However, these relations instantiated between material events need not x their embedding
into Minkowski spacetime up to Poincaré transformations.e examples discussed by Mundy et
al. involve a small nite number of events, but the problem generalises to certain congurations
of continuum many. E.g., consider two particles which move so that any two events from distinct
trajectories are always spacelike (the events on each trajectory are all mutually timelike). We know
that, as t → ±∞, the particles must be accelerating in opposite directions, but not much more.
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however, the relationalist succeeds so long as they can identify, in a relationally
respectable manner, a set of relational DPMs that correspond to the full set of New-
tonian DPMs. Can the neo-Newtonian relationalist nd dynamical laws expressed
directly in terms of neo-Newtonian relations that achieve this?
As far as I know, no one has seriously attempted to construct such laws. Even so,
one knows that any such lawswill exhibit a particularly unattractive feature: they will
not be expressible as dierential equations that admit an initial value formulation.54
In standard Newtonian theory the specication of the instantaneous positions and
velocities of the particles with respect to some inertial frame suces, via the laws, to
determine the particles’ relative positions and motions at all times. Strictly speaking,
what needs to be specied at an instant transcends the specication of the intrinsic
state of that instant: in specifying velocities one is specifying quantities that are ulti-
mately grounded in the pattern of the instantiation of collinearity relations between
non-simultaneous spacetime points. But the relevant points lie in the innitesimal
neighbourhood of each instant and so can be used, via the usual limiting procedure,
to dene derivative quantities that are possessed at that instant. What Maudlin’s
example illustrates is that there can be nite stretches of time in a neo-Newtonian
relational world such that no non-simultaneous triples of material events occurring
during that time instantiate the collinearity relation. Indeed, this is a generic feature
of neo-Newtonian relational worlds of point particles. e collinearity relation,
therefore, cannot be used to dene derivative quantities that can supplement the
instantaneous data denable in terms of Leibnizian relations.
e problem faced by Newtonian relationalism suggested neo-Newtonian re-
lationalism; the trouble faced by neo-Newtonian relationalism suggests another,
rather desperate, relationalist manoeuvre. If the problem is the lack of appropriate
instantaneous quantities, why not simply co-opt as primitive certain derivative
instantaneous quantities available to the substantivalist? is, in essence, is how
Sklar proposes the relationalist treat absolute accelerations; as intrinsic, primitive,
time-varying properties possessed by particles at every instant of their trajectories
(Sklar, 1974, 230). Huggett usefully dubs them Sklarations (Huggett, 1999, 27).
It is not obvious how the relationalist is supposed to use this additional ideol-
ogy. Skow notes that simply supplementing Leibnizian relational initial data with
Sklarations fails to x a Newtonian history. Consider, for example, the following
pair of two-particle solutions to Newton’s theory of gravitation (Skow, 2007, 783–4).
In one solution the two bodies follow circular orbits about their common centre of
mass. In the second solution the particles travel in on parabolic paths from spatial
innity to sling-shot past each other before heading back out to innity. Suppose
that the distance of closest approach of the particles in the second solution matches
54is objection to neo-Newtonian relationalism, reported by Huggett (1999, 26), is again due to
Maudlin.
29
the constant separation of the particles in the rst.en, at the moment of closest
approach, the second solution matches the rst in terms of its Leibnizian initial data
and absolute accelerations: the separation between the particles is the same, its rate
of change is zero (it is the moment of closest approach) and, because accelerations
due to gravity depend only on the masses of particles and the relative separation
between them, the Sklarations are the same too.
In fact, this problem is generic. Precisely because, according to any Newtonian
theory satisfying Newton’s third law of motion, forces and hence absolute accelera-
tions are functions only of the relative distances, they are eectively already included
in the Leibnizian initial data.us every set of Leibnizian initial data “supplemented”
with Sklarations will radically underdetermine the future evolution of any system
of interacting Newtonian particles. As we saw in Section 5.1, this evolution depends
on the overall angular momentum and the Leibnizian initial data, with or without
Sklarations, does not tell us what this is.
Skow’s assumption about the appropriate initial data for a theory employing
Sklarations could be questioned. Why should the Sklar relationalist not include,
say, the rst time derivatives of Sklarations?55What the relationist really needs to
provide are some relatively natural equations involving Sklarations that x their
theory’s DPMs, for these will determine what the appropriate initial data are.
Sklar himself did not esh out his proposal. Both Friedman (1983, 234) and
Huggett (1999, 27) suggest that the Sklar relationist can simply utilise Newton’s
second law as expressed in arbitrary rigid Euclidean coordinate systems, i.e., coor-
dinate systems adapted to the Leibnizian relational ideology. However, it is not at
all straightforward how Sklarations are supposed to feature in such a formulation
of Newton’s second law.56More signicantly, Friedman’s and Huggett’s attempt to
reinterpret the standard equations in terms of Sklarations does not even get o
the ground unless Sklarations are additionally constrained to be embeddable in
spacetime as four-accelerations. But why should the instantiation of an allegedly
primitive monadic property be constrained in this way as a matter of metaphysical
necessity? Regarded as a kinematical constraint, the requirement is very shy from
55Since these are functions of the r˙ i js, just as Sklarations are functions of the r i js, they would not
actually be of any help either.e situation changes if higher derivatives are allowed.
56Friedman’s expression of the law is F i/m = x¨ i + a i + 2a˙ ji x˙ j + a¨kixk (Friedman, 1983, 226, eqn 8;
I have slightly altered the notation). F i is the ith component of Newtonian (three-)force on the
particle we are considering and x i(t) is the ith component of its position vector with respect to
some rigid Euclidean coordinate system. a i is the ith component of the absolute acceleration of the
origin of the coordinate system (i.e., the Sklaration that a hypothetical particle would have were it
comoving with the coordinate origin). a˙ ji is the rotation of the coordinate system about its origin
with respect to an inertial frame.us only the rst of the three additional terms on the right-hand
side of the equation is directly interpretable in terms of a Sklaration, and then only if we pick a
coordinate system that happens to have a particle comoving with its origin. Crucially, we need to be
told how to interpret the rotation pseudo-vector a˙ ji in terms of Sklarations.
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a relationalist perspective.e alternative is to view the constraint only as a restric-
tion on the physically possible, i.e., as an additional “law of motion” governing the
evolution of Sklarations (and constraining admissible initial data).57 Either way, a
strong suspicion must remain that, in this guise, Sklarations do not constitute a
genuine alternative to accelerations and the attendant substantivalist commitments
they require.
e relationalist needs ideologyweaker thanNewtonian relations but richer than
the neo-Newtonian’s collinearity relation. In particular, ideology that is suciently
richly instantiated in the neighbourhood of any instant is needed in order to avoid
the initial value problem faced by the neo-Newtonian relationalist. Sklarations
might have been expected to provide what was needed but, because the quantities
are treated as primitive, their necessary connections with the relational states of
the world at earlier and later times is severed. Putting these connections back in by
hand looks like substantivalism by another name.
is suggests that to avoid the pitfalls of Sklarations the relationalist should look
for ideology that is instantiated by some n-tuples of non-simultaneous events. And
to avoid the pitfalls of neo-Newtonian relationalism, this ideology should be instan-
tiated by n-tuples of non-simultaneous events in the innitesimal neighbourhood
of any instant. Further, any kinematic constraints on the possible instantiation of
this ideology should be comprehensible independently of its interpretation, once
appropriately embedded, in neo-Newtonian spacetime.
It is certainly possible to specify relational ideology that meets these require-
ments58 but at this point we should take a step back and recall the structure of the
original dilemma posed by Galilean invariance. A dynamical symmetry group that
was larger than the spacetime symmetry group leads to in-principle unobservable
quantities; a spacetime symmetry group larger than the dynamical symmetry group
requires a non-standard story about the privileged status of some dynamically pre-
ferred frames of reference (for they form a proper subset of thosemaximally adapted
to the spacetime quantities). I have given the impression that, in the context of
classical mechanics, the structures of neo-Newtonian spacetime get things just right,
but in fact this is not the case: the dynamical symmetry group of Newtonian physics
is in fact larger than the Galilei group.
In inertial frame coordinates, the eld-theoretic form of Newton’s law of gravi-
57Mundy (1983, 224) even interprets the Euclidean constraints on instantaneous distances similarly,
so that his relationalist does not need a primitive notion of geometric possibility over and above that
of physical possibility.
58I explore some of the options in Pooley (in preparation, Ch. 3). As with Sklarations, the required
“kinematical” constraints on the instantiation of such relations suggest that the proposals are really
substantivalism in disguise.
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tation is expressed by the following equations:
F⃗ = −m∇⃗ϕ (Grav Force)∇2ϕ = 4piGρ (Poisson)
where ϕ is the gravitational potential, G is Newton’s constant and ρ is the mass
density. In the coordinate-free notation of Section 4, these equations become:
Fa = −mhab∇bϕ
hab∇a∇bϕ = 4piGρ.
and the theory has models of the form ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , ρ, ϕ⟩. e coordinate-
dependent equations are invariant under Galilean transformations, which are also
dynamical symmetries in the model-theoretic sense, but these transformations do
not exhaust the symmetries. Consider theMaxwell group59 of coordinate transfor-
mations:
x⃗′ = Rx⃗ + a⃗(t),
t′ = t + d . (Max)
Like those of the Leibniz group, they involve an arbitrary, time-dependent transla-
tion term, a⃗(t). Like those of the Newton and Galilei groups, the rotation matrix
R is not time-dependent.ey therefore correspond to a spacetime structure that
embodies an absolute standard of rotation but no general standard of acceleration.60
ese transformations will also preserve the coordinate-dependent form of the
equations of Newtonian gravitation, and map solutions to solutions, so long as the
gravitational potential eld is also transformed appropriately:
ϕ ↦ ϕ′ = ϕ − x⃗ . ¨⃗a + f (t),
where f (t) is an arbitrary time-dependent function that is constant on surfaces
of simultaneity. It follows that, if d is a dieomorphism corresponding to such
a transformation and ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , ρ, ϕ⟩ is a model of the spacetime formula-
tion of Newtonian gravity we are considering, then so is ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , d∗ρ, ϕ′⟩.
is means that the neo-Newtonian substantivalist is in precisely the same kind of
predicament as the substantivalist who advocated absolute space: their metaphysics
grounds physical quantities (in this case absolute accelerations, rather than absolute
velocities) that it is impossible in principle to detect. Here is another way to see the
59My terminology again follows Earman (1989, 31) and Bain (2004, 351). Ehlers (1973a, 78–9)
discusses the group but leaves it unnamed.
60ere is no canonical dierential-geometric way of capturing this structure. Earman (1989, 32)
resorts to an equivalence class of connections whose congruences of geodesics are non-rotating with
respect to one another. Saunders (2012, §7) oers an elegant characterisation of a similar but strictly
weaker structure.
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problem. Since, for the type of dieomorphism under consideration, d∗tab = tab
and d∗hab = hab, ifM1 = ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇a , ρ, ϕ⟩ is a model of the theory, then so
isM2 = ⟨M , tab , hab ,∇′a , ρ, ϕ′⟩, where ∇′a = (d−1)∗∇a. I.e., the laws and a given
matter distribution ρ x the temporal and spatial metric structures, but they leave it
underdetermined whether the combination of inertial structure and gravitational
force is that given by (∇a , ϕ) or by (∇′a , ϕ′). And if we take the postulated inertial
structures ontologically seriously, these dierences correspond to qualitative dier-
ences. For example, in one model a given particle might be force-free and moving
inertially; in the other it might be accelerated under a gravitational force.61
A natural thought at this point is thatM1 andM2 are merely mathematically
distinct representations of the same physical possibility and that ϕ and∇a are gauge-
dependent quantities. But one cannot simply declare this so by at. One should also
provide a characterisation of a gauge-invariant reality in terms of which the gauge
dependent quantities can be understood. It turns out that the substantivalist can,
indeed, do this.e solution is Newton–Cartan theory, a formulation of Newtonian
gravitation rst developed by Cartan and Friedrichs.62 In this theory, just as in GR,
gravitational phenomena are not the eects of forces.e at inertial connection∇a
is replaced by dynamical inertial structure ∇nca (in part) governed by the following
generalisation of the coordinate-free form of Poisson’s equation:
Rncab = 4hGρtab , (PoissonNC)
which relates the Ricci tensor Rncab dened by ∇nca to the mass density. Our two
models of Newtonian gravity set in neo-Newtonian spacetime,M1 andM2, cor-
respond to a unique model of Newton-Cartan theory (up to isomorphism). Any
given (∇a , ϕ) pair that solves non-geometrized Newtonian gravity determines a
unique dynamical connection but the converse is not true: a given Newton–Cartan
connection can always be decomposed into a at connection and a gravitational
potential, but this decomposition is non-unique in a way that corresponds exactly to
the underdetermination of gravitational theory set in neo-Newtonian spacetime.63
While the problemof the symmetries ofNewtonian gravity and its substantivalist
solution are relatively well-known, the fact that an enriched-ideology relationalist
strategy can also be fruitfully pursued is far less appreciated. When canvassing
enriched relationalist options earlier in the section, the operative assumption was
that Newtonian dynamics was Galilean invariant. Now that the larger Maxwell
61is problem for Newtonian gravitation set in neo-Newtonian spacetime is well-known. For a
related discussion in the philosophical literature, see, e.g., Friedman (1983, 95–7).
62is theory is presented as the solution to the problem faced by the Galilean substantivalist by
Friedman (1983, 97–104; 120–4). See also Malament (1995), who presents it as a solution to a closely
related problem raised by Norton (1993).
63Malament (2012, Ch. 4) reviews these results and Newton–Cartan theory more generally; see
also Bain (2004).
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group has been recognised as a symmetry group, a reevaluation is needed. e
equations of any N-body Newtonian system whose force laws obey Newton’s third
law can be re-expressed as:
¨⃗ri j = 1mi N∑k≠i F⃗ki − 1m j N∑k≠ j F⃗k j (1)
where r⃗i j ∶= (x⃗i − x⃗ j) is the directed relative distance between particles i and j
and F⃗i j is the force exerted by particle i on particle j (Hood, 1970; see Earman,
1989, 81, for discussion). For the time derivatives of r⃗i j to be well dened, the full
inertial structure of neo-Newtonian spacetime is not required. All that is needed
is a standard of rotation, i.e., exactly the spatiotemporal structure invariant under
the Maxwell group. Since we are assuming Newton’s third law is also satised,
the only spatial dependence of F⃗i j will be on r⃗i j. It follows that Equation (1) is
invariant under the Maxwell group.e only ideology, in addition to Leibnizian-
relational quantities, needed to ground a standard of rotation is the transtemporal
comparison of the directions of the directed distances betweenmaterial bodies.64 For
example, theMaxwellian relationalist can postulate a primitive four-place relation
A on material events such that, when (e1, e2) and (e3, e4) are pairs of simultaneous
events, A(e1, e2, e3, e3) takes a value between 0 and 2pi, to be interpreted as the angle
betweenÐ→e1e2 andÐÐ→e3e4.
What this shows is that the full set of Newtonian solutions for a nite system
of interacting particles can be given a bona de relationalist interpretation (with
or without Newtonian gravitation). With Earman (1989, 81), we should now ask
whether the basic idea can generalise to eld theory. Maxwellian relationalism for
eld congurations can easily be implemented using Barbour’s best-matching ma-
chinery, discussed in Section 6.2, so eld theory per se is not an obstacle.65 Barbour’s
machinery, however, is only applicable to spatially nite systems (or systems with
appropriate spatial boundary conditions). In such “island universe” scenarios, the
64As far as I am aware, Simon Saunders was the rst to stress that transtemporal comparison of
directions are obviously compatible with relationalist ontology. Saunders (2012) is a recent discussion
of related topics. I am grateful to him for discussion. Earman (1989, 78–81) comes close to attributing
the basic idea to James Clerk Maxwell, who, when discussing absolute rotation in Maxwell (1877,
§104), wrote: “in comparing one conguration of the system with another, we are able to draw a
line in the nal conguration parallel to a line in the original conguration.” Earman’s assessment
is that “Maxwell’s set of parallel directions is, of course, inertial structure, and in modern terms
what he seems to be proposing is that neo-Newtonian spacetime is the appropriate arena for the
scientic description of motion” (Earman, 1989, 80). However, it is clear that Maxwell here only
assumes a standard of parallelism for spacelike lines which, as we have seen, does not require the
full structure of neo-Newtonian spacetime. Perhaps Earman did not realised how apt his label
Maxwellian spacetime is.
65One “best matches” instantaneous congurations only with respect to rigid translations and
not, as Barbour does, by translations, rotations and dilations.
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Maxwellian invariance of dynamics does not trouble the neo-Newtonian substanti-
valist, for a preferred inertial connection can be identied via the condition that the
total three-momentum of the whole system is constant. Underdetermination only
genuinely arises for the neo-Newtonian substantivalist in Newtonian cosmology
when we consider, e.g., innite homogeneous matter distributions. As far as I know,
no relationalist theory for such situations has been devised.e Maxwellian rela-
tionalist seems to be in the unfortunate position of having a solution applicable to
those cases that are not genuine problems and no solution for the truly troubling
cases.
In the context of eld theory, there is one relatively easy way out for the rela-
tionalist.66 Recall that the troubles faced by the neo-Newtonian relationalist arose
because, in a world of point particles, the three-place collinearity relation typically
will not be instantiated by material events in the innitesimal neighbourhood of
a given material point. If the relationalist embraces a plenum, this problem goes
away. In the context of Newtonian gravity, the relationalist can combine a mate-
rial plenum with the insight of Newton–Cartan theory and postulate a primitive
three-place collinearity relation on material events that holds of triples of material
events in a physically possible world just if, in the corresponding substantivalist
model, they lie on a geodesic of the substantivalist’s dynamical ane connection.
Such a Newton–Cartan relationalist still has work to do.e characterisation of
the position just given made crucial reference to substantivalist models. Can the
standard mathematical formalism of Newton–Cartan theory be independently un-
derstood in terms of such relational ideology? What are the material elds and why
must they constitute a plenum? Similar questions recur in the context of relativistic
physics, where elds are no longer optional extras. It is to relativity we now turn.
6.1.2 Relativity
In the context of classical mechanics, the relationalist who pursues the enriched-
ideology strategy is forced to be creative. Simply co-opting substantivalist ideology
(by restricting the domain of possible instantiation to the material events) fails, pri-
marily because of the relative sparseness of the relationalist’s ontology in comparison
to the substantivalist’s plenum of spacetime points. In the context of SR, however,
the at-footed move works. Restricting the substantivalist’s ideology—Minkowski
spacetime distances—to material events xes the embedding of a relational history
into Minkowski spacetime (up to isomorphism). Further, Minkowski distances
conceived of as relationalist ideology can be used to frame dynamical principles
directly in relationalist terms.67
66I am grateful to David Wallace for highlighting this possibility.
67e main discussions of a position of this sort are Earman (1989, 128–30) and Maudlin (1993,
196–9).
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Central to relativistic mechanics (even if not to relativistic physics in general),
is the idea that unaccelerated motion is default behaviour and that accelerations
are due to forces. In order to lay claim to this picture, theMinkowski relationalist
needs accounts of both accelerations and forces. In classical mechanics, forces
were unproblematic for the relationalist (because they are functions of Leibnizian
relational quantities); it was acceleration that proved troublesome. In relativity, the
diculties are reversed.
Consider the standard, coordinate-dependent forms of relativistic laws. e
privileged class of coordinate systems relative to which these equations hold are
simply those adapted to the Minkowski distance relations between material events
(cf. page 17). Dynamically signicant absolute acceleration, therefore, is simply
acceleration relative to the coordinate systems adapted to the relationalist’s spa-
tiotemporal distances. In fact, the Minkowski relationalist can do better and give an
intrinsic characterisation of acceleration. Recall that, in Minkowski spacetime, the
inertial trajectories are not structure over and above the spatiotemporal distances;
the straight line in spacetime between two temporally separated events is the path of
maximal temporal distance.is means that a particle will be unaccelerated just if,
for any temporally ordered points p, q, r of its trajectory, I(p, r) = I(p, q) + I(q, r)
and, conversely, if I(p, r) > I(p, q)+ I(q, r), we know that the particle is accelerated
between the points p and r (Earman, 1989, 129).e four-acceleration of a trajectory
at a point just is the intrinsic curvature of the trajectory at that point and so, as for
curves in Euclidean space, one can dene the acceleration of the particle (both its
magnitude and its direction) in terms of such distances.68
e Minkowski relationalist treatment of forces is less straightforward. e
coordinate-free statement of the second law, Fa = mξn∇nξa, is formally the same
in classical mechanics and SR and, in both cases, the four-force, Fa, must be a
spacelike vector.is formal identity, however, hides a crucial dierence. In the neo-
Newtonian case, spacelike vectors lie in (i.e., are tangent to) surfaces of simultaneity.
As a result neo-Newtonian four-forces can be dened in terms of Leibnizian spatial
distances, which are intrinsic to such surfaces. In the Minkowski case, if one
considers an arbitrary spacelike hyperplane and the accelerations of a number of
interacting particles at the points where their trajectories intersect this plane, then,
in general, none of these accelerations will be tangent to the hyperplane. It is no
accident that in relativistic theories Fa is standardly given as a local function of
elds.69
68A treatment of acceleration along these lines can be found in Minkowski’s original presentation
(Minkowski, 1908, 85–6).
69Relativistic theories in which the four-force on a particle at a point is determined directly by the
properties of other particles at other spacetime locations are not impossible; Feynman andWheeler’s
version of electromagnetism is such a “pure particle” theory (Wheeler and Feynman, 1949).ese
theories, however, have various unwelcome features, and their empirical adequacy remains an open
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Some think that the need to invoke elds is a problem for the relationalist. On
one (natural) interpretation, elds are simply assignments of properties or states
to the points of spacetime (Field, 1985, 40). Such a view does indeed presuppose
substantivalism, but there is an alternative available, and it is one that arguably
ts more naturally the language employed by physicists. On this other view, the
eld itself is reied as a vast, spatiotemporally extended object in its own right.70
Adopting this second conception of elds does not, by itself, amount to relationalism;
many substantivalists will agree that at least some elds are extended objects in
spacetime (rather than properties of spacetime).71 Taking a ‘relational’ view of a
eld also does not by itself commit one to the view that such a eld could exist in
the absence of spacetime, or have the very properties one’s theory characterises it as
having (cf. footnote 38).e devil will be in the details.
Consider the simple case of a eld, ϕ, with just one degree of freedom per
spacetime point.e relationalist wishes to view ϕ as an extended, physical entity
rather than as an assignment of properties to spacetime. Since spacetime itself is
supposed not to exist, this extended object cannot be characterized in terms of the
spatiotemporal locations of the various eld intensities. Instead, the relationalist
should view the eld as characterized by the innite number of facts about the
Minkowski distances between its pointlike parts; together these fully characterise
the pattern of eld intensities.72ese distances cannot (in practice) be specied
directly. But there is nothing relationally improper about describing the eld relative
to a Lorentzian coordinate system so long as such a chart is thought of as a map
directly from the eld itself into R4 that encodes the Minkowski distances.
Consider, now, the substantivalist’s presentation of a theory of such a eld.
e KPMs will be of the form ⟨M , ηab , ϕ⟩ and the DPMs will be picked out via
an equation relating ϕ and ηab. Suppose the relationalist’s only way to identify
dynamically possible eld congurations was to use this machinery. Would they
then be in the embarrassing position of relying on a substantivalist “fairy tale”
without a proper explanation of why it works (Earman, 1989, 172)? It doesn’t seem
so.at ϕ is the only eld in themodel reied by the relationalist does not mean that
ηab is a ction.e substantivalist suggests that one understands elds as assigning
various properties and relations. In this case, the relationalist agrees. ey just
question; see Earman (1989, 155–8) for discussion.
70See Malament (1982, 532, fn 11), who is responding to Field’s argument. Other clear expressions
of this view can be found in Belot (1999, 45) and Rovelli (2001, 104).
71As the rest of this section illustrates, still less does the move trivialise the substantivalist–
relationalist debate (pace Field, 1985, 41), although it does excuse the relationalist from replacing
eld theories with action-at-a-distance theories.
72Note that this constitutes an answer to Earman’s challenge that the relationalist must provide a
“direct characterization” of reality underlying the substantivalist’s description of elds (Earman, 1989,
171).
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disagree about the subject of predication: for the substantivalist it is spacetime itself,
for the relationalist it is the one substantival eld of the model, ϕ. Equations relating
ϕ to the other elds then have a straightforward relationalist reading as claims about
the allowed (geometrical) properties of ϕ itself.
So far I have only considered scalar elds. More complex elds can pose addi-
tional problems for the relationalist. Standard vector and tensor elds, for example,
are not obviously conceptually independent of the structure of the manifold on
which they are dened. eir degrees of freedom at a point are normally under-
stood as taking values in the tangent space at that point (or in more complex spaces
constructed in terms of it), which might appear to presuppose the dierentiable
structure of the manifold on which the elds are dened. In fact, even character-
ising scalar elds normally involves this manifold structure, for one is normally
interested in smooth elds. In this case, however, it is clear how one can do away
with reference to an independent manifold. What one requires (roughly speaking)
is that the eld’s values vary smoothly as a function of the distances between its
parts: elds themselves can have the structure of a dierentiable manifold in virtue
of these Minkowski distances. Vector and tensor elds, conceived of as substantival
entities in their own right, will likewise have a manifold structure, but there is
something suspiciously circular about taking the spaces in terms of which a eld’s
degrees of freedom are dened to be themselves dened in terms of that eld’s
own spatiotemporal extension. An alternative is to try to understand the degrees
of freedom of some material elds in terms of their interactions with other elds
whose relational credentials are not in doubt.73
e upshot is that the combination of Minkowski relationalism and a relational
interpretation of elds is at least a going concern as an interpretation of SR.e
nal task for this section is to consider whether the picture can be adapted to
GR.e strong similarities between SR and GR stressed in Section 4.3 might lead
the relationalist to be optimistic. In fact, the move from at to curved geometric
structure, and the manner in which it features in GR, presents a formidable obstacle.
Recall that theMinkowski relationalist does not reify themetric eld ηab. Instead this
eld is regarded as cataloguing primitive spatiotemporal distances that hold between
the parts of bona dematerial elds. At the level of kinematics, the generalisation of
this to GR is straightforward. Minkowski distances are simply replaced by those of a
curved semi-Riemannian geometry. A crucial consequence of this move is that the
distances instantiated between material events need no longer x (independently
of the dynamical laws) all the facts about the geometry of spacetime. In particular,
consider an “island universe” involving a matter distribution of nite spatial extent.
e spatiotemporal distances instantiated in the history of the material world will
73See, for example, Malament (2004, §3), where the tensorial properties of the electromagnetic
eld Fab are derived from assumptions about its action on charges.
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not x the geometry of the empty spacetime regions beyond it.
is is not a problem of principle. Aer all, the relationalist will claim that there
is literally nothing beyond the boundary of the material universe to instantiate one
geometry rather than another. ere is also no diculty, in principle, with this
type of relationalist regarding geometry as dynamical and as inuenced by matter.
For example, the laws of a relational theory could lay down how the network of
spatiotemporal relations instantiated in some temporally thick slice through the
material world determine (together with other dynamically relevant properties
of matter) the pattern of spatiotemporal relations instantiated in earlier and later
regions of the material universe.e particular diculty GR poses for the envisaged
relationalist involves the combination of these two factors. In GR the geometrical
properties of the supposed non-entity beyond the material universe do make a
dynamical dierence. For example, the entire history of spatiotemporal distances
instantiated in our island universe up to some time will not record whether a
“gravitational wave” (i.e., a propagating ripple in the fabric of spacetime itself) is
approaching from outside the system and will thus underdetermine the system’s
future evolution (Earman, 1989, 130; Maudlin, 1993, 199).
In response, the relationalist could rule out by at models with empty regions
of spacetime. To do so, however, is not only to give up on the goal of empirical
equivalence with standard theory; it is to impose a restriction that is arbitrary by the
lights of the relationalist’s own theoretical apparatus.e relationalist does not have
problems with empty regions per se. What they have problems with is those regions
having a determinate geometry that need not supervene on the properties of and
relations between matter-lled regions and with the geometry of empty regions
playing the dynamical role that GR assigns it.e better “relationalist” move is to
treat the metric tensor as a “material” eld in its own right, but then, since all parties
arm the existence of a substantival entity whose properties are characterised by
gab, it is not clear what substantive issue remains.74
6.2 Barbour’s Machian Relationalism
ere are two straightforward relationalist responses to the mismatch between
relationalist spacetime symmetries and the dynamical symmetries of Newtonian
mechanics.e previous section covered one of these: enrich relationalist ideology
in order to bring spacetime symmetries into line.is section investigates the other:
change the dynamics in order to bring the dynamical symmetries into line.emost
74e relationalist can also question whether one should regard regions of zero eld strength as
regions where the material eld literally does not exist.is might be the natural interpretation of
elds that represent “dust” inmodels of GR, but it is at least controversial for, e.g., the electromagnetic
eld.e stipulation is yet more problematic when one moves to quantum eld theory. I am grateful
to David Wallace for pressing this point.
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thorough and successful development of this strategy is that of Julian Barbour and
collaborators.e labelMachian relationalism is appropriate for three reasons. First,
it accords with Barbour’s own terminology. He sees the requirement that a theory
be maximally predictive with respect to relational initial data (in the sense discussed
in Section 5.1) as a precise version ofMach’s Principle and he takes his approach to
dynamics to reveal thatGR is in fact aMachian theory. Secondly, in the context of pre-
relativistic particle dynamics, the spacetime quantities Barbour takes as fundamental
are even sparser than those of the Leibnizian relationalist: the Euclidean nature
of the instantaneous relative distances between particles is accepted as primitive,
but the temporal intervals between successive instantaneous congurations are
not. In his critique of Newton, Mach (1901, 222–6) claimed that the question of
whether a motion is in itself uniform is senseless, on the grounds that a motion
can (allegedly) only be judged uniform relative to some other motion or material
process.75 Finally, Barbour’s particle theories provide a concrete implementation
of Mach’s idea that the inertial properties of a body might be understood in terms
of that body’s relations to the rest of the bodies in the universe, rather than with
respect to substantival spacetime structure (Mach, 1901, 231–5).
Up to this point I have presented the DPMs of a theory as singled out in terms
of dierential equations that must be everywhere satised within a model by its
constituent elds and particle trajectories. In some formulations of dynamics, the
DPMs are singled out in terms of their relations to other KPMs. Machian relational
theories are most illuminatingly developed in this type of framework. Consider,
in particular, the Lagrangian formulation of Newtonian mechanics. Central to
this framework is a system’s conguration space, Q, the points of which represent
possible instantaneous states of the system. According to the substantivalist, such
a state for an N-particle system corresponds to a set of positions for each particle
relative to some inertial frame. Q is then 3N-dimensional. As the system evolves,
the point in Q representing the system’s instantaneous state traces out a continuous
curve. In Lagrangian mechanics, KPMs (i.e., metaphysically possible histories)
are (monotonically rising) curves in the product space formed from Q and a one-
dimensional space, T , representing time.e DPMs are those curves that extremize
a particular functional of such histories (the action).
is framework can be adapted to Leibnizian and Machian relationalism in a
straightforward way. First, since the relationalist’s possible instantaneous states cor-
respond to sets of inter-particle distances (rather than positions dened with respect
to spacetime structure), the relationalist replaces Q with the relative conguration
space QRCS. For N particles, QRCS is (3N − 6)-dimensional. In fact, the relationalist
75For related reasons, Earman denes Machian spacetime to be spacetime with simultaneity
structure and Euclidean metrical structure on its simultaneity surfaces but with no temporal metric
(Earman, 1989, 27–30).
40
might be tempted to go further. Formulating dynamics in terms of QRCS involves
treating transtemporal comparisons of length as primitive. Distinct curves in QRCS
can correspond to exactly similar sequences of Euclidean congurations if some of
the corresponding congurations represented in the two curves dier in overall size.
is is not true in shape space (QSS), a conguration space of one less dimension that
treats only the ratios of distances within congurations as physically meaningful.
Secondly, standard theory distinguishes histories that correspond to a single
curve in conguration space being traced out at dierent rates with respect to the
primitive temporal metric.e Machian relationalist, in contrast, will view each
curve in conguration space as corresponding to exactly one possible history.ey
therefore dispense with T , the space encoding primitive temporal separations, in
favour of a “timeless” formulation of dynamics in terms of conguration space
alone. One way to do this is to equip the space with a metric.e DPMs are then
picked out via a geodesic principle: physically possible histories correspond to paths
in conguration space of extremal length relative to the metric.
e implementation of this second step can be achieved via a reinterpretation of
Jacobi’s Principle, part of the standard toolkit of Newtonian dynamics.76e metric
structure of three-dimensional physical space can be used to dene a metric on
Q known as the kinetic metric: ds2kin = ∑i m i2 dx⃗i .dx⃗i . Its geodesics correspond to
histories of particles moving inertially. Dynamics is incorporated by multiplying
ds2kin by a conformal factor FE = (E − V(x⃗1, . . . , x⃗N)). e geodesic principle is
then:
δI = 0, I = ∫√FEdskin = 2 ∫ dλ√FETkin, (2)
where Tkin ∶= 12 N∑i mi dx⃗idλ ⋅ dx⃗idλ . (3)
Its solutions correspond to Newtonian histories of a system of N particles with a
total energy E interacting according to the potential V . Tkin looks like the standard
Newtonian kinetic energy but note that λ represents an arbitrary parameterization
of paths in Q: the path length I is invariant under reparameterizations: λ ↦ λ′ =
f (λ), where d f /dλ > 0 but f is otherwise arbitrary. e equations of motion

















ese simplify dramatically, reducing to the standard form of Newton’s second law,
if the freedom in the choice of λ is exploited to set FE = Tkin, i.e., E = Tkin +V .e
76It should be stressed that Barbour initially postulated a Jacobi-like action on purely Machian
grounds and only learned of the connections with standard dynamics several years aerwards.
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substantivalist sees imposing this requirement as a way to determine the rate at
which the system traces out its path in Q relative to a primitive temporal metric.
e Machian sees the equation as dening an emergent temporal metric in terms
of the temporal parameter that simplies the dynamics of the system as a whole
(Barbour, 1994, 2008).77
Jacobi’s principle involves a metric on Q. To construct a relational theory, we
need ametric onQRCS. One can be obtained by replacingTkin (a function of velocities
dened with respect to inertial structure) with a function of the relative velocities
r˙i j.eories of this kind were independently discovered on a number of occasions
during the 20th century.78ey predict mass anisotropy eects (how easy it is to
accelerate a body becomes direction dependent) that are ruled out by experiment.
It is also not clear how they might generalise to eld theory, where analogues of
the transtemporal particle identities used in the denition of the r˙i js are absent.
Barbour and Bertotti (1982) found a way to surmount both problems.
e (ambitious) relationalist thinks of instantaneous congurations as com-
pletely characterised by the ratios of inter-particle separations. A three-dimensional
coordinate system encodes such data just if ∣x⃗i − x⃗ j∣/∣x⃗m − x⃗n∣ = ri j/rmn for all par-
ticles i , j,m, n. If one coordinate system satises this constraint, so will any other
related to it by a rigid rotation, translation or a dilation (an overall change of scale).
e relationalist therefore regards the points of Q, not as specications of positions
in some inertial frame, but as natural representations of relational congurations.
e representation involves some redundancy: points of Q connected by an element
of the similarity group (the group of rigid translations, rotations and dilations) cor-
respond to the same relative conguration. Q is partitioned by the group into sets
of such points (the group orbits). Consider, now, two paths in Q that correspond to
the same sequence of relative congurations. A metric on Q will, in general, assign
them dierent lengths. However, starting from any given point p in Q, one can
use the action of the similarity group on Q to dene a unique length, by shiing
the points of any curve through p along the corresponding group orbits so as to
extremize the length assigned to the curve.is is the process Barbour and Bertotti
called best matching.79 It is depicted in Figure 1.
77Note that choosing a simplifying parameter for Equation (4) is quite unlike choosing a time
coordinate that is adapted to the spacetime substantivalist’s temporal metric.e latter also simplies
the (generally covariant) equations, but these equations explicitly refer to an independent standard
of duration. According to the Machian interpretation of Jacobi’s Principle, fundamental dynamics is
formulated without reference to such an external time. See Pooley (2004, 78–9).
78Noteworthy examples are Hofmann (1904), Reissner (1914), Schrödinger (1925), Barbour (1974a),
Barbour and Bertotti (1977) and Assis (1989). For further discussion see Earman (1989, 92–6) and
Barbour and Pster (1995, 107–78).
79For an informal discussion of the central idea, see Barbour (1999, Ch. 7). For the extension to













Figure 1: BestMatching.e curvesC1 andC2 inQ correspond to the same sequence
of relative congurations. q2 is the point on the orbit containing q1 that minimises
the distance along the curve from p1. r2 is similarly related to q2. C2 is the best-
matched curve; the length along it gives the length along C, the corresponding
curve in QSS.
If best matching is to dene a metric on QSS (the quotient of Q by the similarity
group), the metric on Q must have the right properties. In particular, suppose p1
and p2 are points on the same group orbit that are widely separated in Q . Consider
two paths through p1 and p2 respectively that correspond to the same sequence of
relative congurations. Suppose one now best matches these paths, keeping the
points p1 and p2 xed. Best matching only leads to a well-dened metric on QSS
if the same result is obtained in each case. e metric ds2 = FEds2kin satises this
requirement provided FE meets certain conditions.
If one rst considers best matching just with respect to the Euclidean group
(translations and rotations), V must be a function only of the relative distances, ri j.
is requirement is satised by familiar Newtonian potentials.e corresponding
best-matched theories, which take DPMs to be geodesics of the metric induced on
QRCS, have as solutions sequences of relative congurations that correspond to the
standard Newtonian solutions with zero overall angular momentum (relative to
the centre-of-mass frame).e fact that a subset of standard Newtonian solutions
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is recoverable by this method highlights the fact that the theories provide a rela-
tional interpretation of inertial structure: best matching establishes a non-primitive
“equilocality relation”, corresponding to the space of the inertial frame in which the
system’s total linear and angular momenta vanish. Note, also, that the recovery of
only a proper subset of the solutions of standard dynamics is arguably a strength
of the best-matching theory (assuming solutions capable of modelling the actual
world fall within this set).is is because the theory predicts and explains a feature
of the world (the vanishing of its overall angular momentum) that is a contingent
fact on the orthodox Newtonian view (Pooley and Brown, 2002; Pooley, 2004).80
Best matching with respect to dilations imposes a more severe requirement: FE
must be a homogeneous function of the x⃗is of degree −2, in order to compensate
for the scaling behaviour of ds2kin. Standard Newtonian potentials do not have
this property, but they can nevertheless be incorporated as eective potentials in
scale-invariant theories if a weak, epoch-dependent universal force is also included
(Barbour, 2003, 1556–7).
Barbour’s framework for non-relativistic particle dynamics, therefore, consti-
tutes a genuinely relationalist (and potentially fruitful) alternative to Newtonian
physics as standardly conceived. What one is really interested in, though, is how the
programme transfers to relativistic physics.e best matching idea can be applied
in the context of SR (Barbour and Bertotti, 1982, 302–3), but I move straight to
a consideration of GR, where the results are truly surprising. e rst step is to
consider how one might generalise the framework to congurations manifesting
a variably-curved Riemannian geometry. One confronts the issue, raised in Sec-
tion 6.1.2, of how to deal with the possibility that the geometry of empty space
might be both non-trivial and non-reducible to relations between material bodies.
Barbour bites the bullet. In the context of GR, the Machian “relationalist” takes the
geometry of substantival (instantaneous) space as primitive.
Assume that instantaneous space has the determinate topology of some closed
3-manifold without boundary, Σ.e obvious analogue of Q is then Riem(Σ), the
space of Riemannian 3-metrics on Σ. An analogue of QRCS is superspace: the space
of 3-geometries. Two points (Σ, hab) and (Σ, h′ab) of Riem(Σ) correspond to the
same 3-geometry just if they are isometric, i.e., just if, for some dieomorphism d of
Σ, h′ab = d∗hab. Superspace is therefore Riem(Σ)/Di(Σ), the quotient of Riem(Σ)
by the group of dieomorphisms of Σ.
Proceeding as before, one seeks an action principle on superspace dened, via
best matching, in terms of a metric on Riem(Σ). In this case, best matching is
implemented by dieomorphisms of Σ. Seeking as direct a parallel as possible with
80Similarly, one can argue that the Machian relationalist is able to explain formal features of the
potential, such as its dependence only on the r i js, that are again nonessential aspects of standard
Newtonian theory (Barbour, 2011).
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Jacobi’s Principle (2) leads to a Riem(Σ) geodesic principle of the form:
δI = 0, I = ∫ dλ√ ∫ d3x√hW ∫ d3x√hT . (5)
e rst integral inside the square root is the analogue of the conformal factor FE
in (2);81 the second is the analogue of the (parameterized) kinetic energy. In this
case, T = GabcdA h˙ab h˙cd , where h˙ab = dhab/dλ are the metric velocities (with respect
to the arbitrary path parameter λ) and the general form of the supermetric GabcdA is
hachbd + Ahabhcd , where A is an arbitrary constant. Best matching with respect to
3-dieomorphisms is achieved by replacing T with TBM = GabcdA (h˙ab −Lξ˙hab)(h˙cd −
Lξ˙hcd) and extremizing with respect to variations in ξ˙a.82
eories of this kind make good sense but they do not provide direct analogues
of GR.83 For these, one needs to consider a Riem(Σ) action principle that involves
a subtle but radical dierence. It has the form:
δI = 0 I = ∫ dλ ∫ d3x√hWT , (6)
withW and T dened as before.e dierence between Principles (5) and (6) is
that, in the former, integration over 3-space occurs within a global square root, but
in the latter the square root is taken at each point of space and occurs within the
spatial integration.84Whereas the reparameterization invariance of (5) gives rise
to a single constraint, the position of the square root in (6) leads to an innity of
constraints, one associated with each point of space. ese must be propagated
by the equations of motion if the theory is to be consistent. is happens only
if A = −1 in GabcdA and W = Λ + αR, where R is the scalar curvature tensor of
hab, and α is 0 or ±1. e choice of α = 1 and the imposition of best matching
with respect to 3-dieomorphisms transforms (6) into the action principle for GR
found by Baierlein, Sharp and Wheeler (1962).is is dynamically equivalent to
the standard spacetime action restricted to globally hyperbolic spacetimes. In other
words, without any spacetime presuppositions and starting with a family of “timeless”
action principles for the evolution of 3-geometries of the general form (6), the
81W can depend on hab and its spatial derivatives up to some nite order; the presence of
h ∶=√det hab is simply to ensure that the integration is invariantly dened.
82If ξa is an innitesimal 3-vector eld, (hab −Lξhab) is the result of acting on hab by an innites-
imal dieomorphism generated by ξa . Lξhab , the Lie derivative of hab with respect to ξa , is given by
Lξhab = ∇a ξb +∇b ξa , where ∇a is the derivative operator associated with the unique torsion-free
connection compatible with hab . For the reason why TBM is dened in terms of the Lie derivatives
with respect the velocity of a 3-vector eld, see Barbour et al. (2002, 3219) and Barbour (2003, §4).
83Gryb (2010, 16–8) contains a brief discussion of these theories.
84e importance of the distinction between (5) and (6), and the fact that GR could be cast in the
form of (6), was rst pointed out to Barbour by Karel Kuchař (Barbour and Bertotti, 1982, 305).
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requirement of mathematical consistency alone (almost) uniquely singles out an
action principle corresponding to GR.85
e BSW action principle for GR, which formally singles out curves in Riem(Σ),
is degenerate: a point and a direction in Riem(Σ) fail to pick out a unique solution.
By itself, this is not a problem for the Machian relationalist. An analogous property
holds of the best-matched action principles for particle dynamics: given a point
and direction in Q, a continuous innity of curves solve the equations.e reason
this is not a drawback in the particle case is that each of these curves corresponds
to the same sequence of relative congurations: they project down to a single
curve in the quotient of Q by the relevant group. e same is not true for the
BSW action. Aer projecting down from Riem(Σ), one still has a continuum of
curves for each point and direction in superspace. Since these curves correspond
to non-isometric sequences of 3-geometries, and since such 3-geometries are the
Machian’s fundamental ontology, the Machian is compelled to regard these curves
as corresponding to physically distinct histories.e theory is therefore radically
indeterministic.e indeterminism is only removed if one can nd a way to regard
all curves with the same initial data as representations of a single physical history. As
we shall see in Section 7, the spacetime substantivalist, who regards spatiotemporal
geometry as primitive, can do this, because the dierent sequences of 3-geometries
correspond to dierent foliations of a single 4-dimensional spacetime.e Machian,
however, who regards spacetime geometry as secondary to, and dened in terms
of, the dynamical evolution of spatial geometry, has no such option (Pooley, 2001,
16–8).
Fortunately for theMachian, this otherwise devastating underdetermination can
be resolved in strictly 3-dimensional terms. In the particle case, the ambitious rela-
tionalist eschewed transtemporal scale comparisons and regarded only the shapes of
congurations as fundamental. Analogous moves are possible in the context of GR.
In particular, in a conformal 3-geometry only angles and the ratios of (innitesimal)
distances are regarded as physically fundamental. In terms of Riem(Σ), one regards
any two 3-metrics related by a (spatially varying) scale transformation as physically
equivalent: hab ∼ ϕhab, ϕ > 0. Conformal superspace is the quotient of Riem(Σ) by
such scale transformations (in addition to 3-dieomorphisms). It can be viewed as
analogous to QSS .
Solutions to the BSW action that share initial data in superspace (i.e., sequences
85is is one of the main results of Barbour et al. (2002), who also claim to recover the equivalence
principle and Maxwellian electromagnetism from the constraints that consistency alone places on
how matter elds can be added to the theory. e results are extended to Yang Mills theory in
Anderson et al. (2003). It should be stressed that these results do not amount to a derivation of GR
and the equivalence principle fromMachian rst principles alone. In addition to the choice of (6)
over (5), the form of (6) embodies a number of simplicity assumptions, the relaxing of which permits
a range of other Machian theories; see Anderson (2007).
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of 3-geometries corresponding to dierent foliations of the same spacetime) do not
project down to a unique curve in conformal superspace. However, the equations of
GR can be recast so as to determine a unique such curve (Barbour andÓMurchadha,
2010). Its points correspond to the foliation of the corresponding spacetime by
spacelike hypersurfaces of constant mean extrinsic curvature. e fact that these
geometrically privileged hypersurfaces simplify and make tractable the initial value
problem in GR has been known since the work of James York in the 1970s. What
the Machian perspective provides is an (alternative) understanding of the relevant
equations in terms of a generalisation of best matching to (volume preserving)
conformal transformations (Anderson et al., 2003, 2005).
e Machian perspective on GR is not relationalist in the sense of this chapter,
but it does oer a mathematically and conceptually elegant (and radical) alternative
to the standard spacetime perspective.e key issue is not an ontological one about
the reality of instantaneous spatial (i.e., spacetime) points (the theory is naturally
understood as committed to them); it concerns the relative priority of spatial versus
spatiotemporal ideology. Despite Barbour’s claims, the local conformal degrees of
freedom of CMC spacelike hypersurfaces are not obviously philosophically superior
to the standard spacetime quantities: they are not (more) directly observable (recall
footnote 36), nor are primitive temporal intervals, or primitive comparisons of
distant lengths, somehow inherently suspect. (In fact, an argument could even
be made that observability considerations favour spacetime over instantaneous
quantities.) Even the parsimony argument in favour of the Machian theory is less
clear-cut in GR than in Newtonian mechanics. In GR it is no longer the case that
the kinematic structures of the Machian theory are simply a proper subset of those
accepted in the spacetime theory.86e true test of the Machian programme will
be its physical fruitfulness, in particular whether, as its advocates hope, it leads to
progress in the search for a theory that successfully reconciles quantum mechanics
and general relativity.
6.3 Have-it-all Relationalism
e relationalist strategies examined in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 involve a certain honesty.
ey accept that restricted dynamical symmetries betoken spacetime structure with
symmetries that are at least as restricted and seek to square this with relationalism,
either by showing how such structure can be both primitive and anchored in a
relationalist ontology or by seeking new dynamics with expanded symmetries.e
approach reviewed in this section is a case of trying to have one’s cake and eat it.
86ere may be good reason to see conformal geometrodynamics as superior to alternative
3 + 1 approaches to GR: its basic quantities are dimensionless and the true degrees of freedom are
transparent (Barbour, 2011, 24, 39).is, though, does not speak directly to the preferability of a
3 + 1 over a spacetime perspective.
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It seeks a way to reconcile restricted dynamical symmetries with more permissive
spacetime symmetries. On this approach, therefore, some of the spacetime struc-
ture implicit in the dynamics is judged to have only an eective status, ultimately
grounded in a less structured relationalist ontology. Huggett’s “regularity approach”
is an explicit proposal about how to do this for Newtonian mechanics.e dynami-
cal approach to special relativity, defended by Brown (2005) and Brown and Pooley
(2006), can be understood along similar lines.
6.3.1 e Regularity Approach to Relational Spacetime
Huggett draws inspiration from some remarks of van Fraassen’s on the meaning
of Newton’s laws. Having posed the problem of how the relationalist can account
for the privileged status of the inertial frames, van Fraassen seeks to dissolve it by
asserting that inertial frames do not have a privileged status at all (van Fraassen,
1970, 116). In claiming this, he is not asserting that Newton’s laws fail to dierentiate
between frames of reference. He acknowledges, of course, that they do. His claim,
rather, is that there need be nothing more to the inertial frames’ being privileged
than their being exactly those frames with respect to which certain statements about
mass, motion and force hold true.
e dierence between this point of view and the standard substantivalist posi-
tion might seem elusive, but it concerns which facts are to be taken as basic. For the
substantivalist, the basic facts include facts about such things as the relative temporal
distances between pairs of events, about what counts as a straight spacetime trajec-
tory, and so on. While the dynamical laws are to be understood in terms of such facts,
and while the success of those laws is acknowledged as our only evidence for there
being such facts, the facts are not to be conceived of as in any way dependent on the
dynamical laws. According to the relationalist view now under consideration, they
are so dependent. Beyond the facts that the Leibnizian relationalist acknowledges
as primitive, the most basic spatiotemporal fact for van Fraassen is the existence of
privileged coordinate systems with respect to which the dynamics of matter takes
on a particularly simple form. Non-relational quantities of motion are to be thought
of as dened in terms of the very laws in which they feature.
Dynamical laws, and the equations that express them, gure prominently in
the characterisation of this position. Exactly what it amounts to, therefore, will
depend on how laws themselves are to be conceived. Suppose, for example, that
laws of nature are held to involve some kind of primitive natural necessity. e
position then becomes the claim that the relative distances between all particles in
the universe are constrained as a matter of nomological necessity to evolve over
time so that they satisfy certain simple equations with respect to a privileged class of
coordinate systems. Such a view, while consistent, has little to recommend it over the
substantivalist’s acceptance at face value of the quantities featuring in the dynamical
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laws.e relationalist is eectively claiming that relative distances between bodies
are constrained to evolve as if each body had an independent quantity ofmotion that
was governed by certain simple laws.is looks like a case where Earman’s charge
that the relationalist position is “hardly distinguishable from instrumentalism” is
justied (Earman, 1989, 128). Whether or not that spells trouble for the relationalist,
their debate with the substantivalist has been replaced by a more generic dispute
and has lost its distinctive character.87
ings look more interesting if one adopts a Humean approach to laws. e
most promising Humean view is the Mill–Ramsey–Lewis “Best Systems” account,
according to which the laws of nature are statements that appear as theorems of those
axiom systems true of the totality of Humean facts that best combine the competing
virtues of simplicity and strength (see, e.g., Lewis, 1973, 72–3; Earman, 1986, Ch. 5).
Without some constraints on admissible vocabulary, the simplicity requirement is
not straightforward, because a theory’s simplicity appears to be language-dependent.
Lewis’ later preferred constraint invokes a primitive distinction amongst properties:
the formulations of candidate laws with respect to which simplicity is to be judged
are in languages whose predicates denote perfectly natural properties and relations
(Lewis, 1983). Huggett’s idea, eectively, is that this requirement can be liberalised
without becoming vacuous. In particular, it is very plausible that, (i) if one assumes
the ontology and ideology of Leibnizian relationalism and (ii) if one allows, as
candidate Humean laws, systems formulated in terms of supervenient properties as
well as perfectly natural properties, Newton’s laws will constitute by far and away
the simplest and strongest systematisation of a typical Leibnizian relational history
compatible with those laws (Huggett, 2006, 48–50).
Unbeknownst to Huggett, a parallel liberalisation of Lewis’ Best Systems pre-
scription had already been outlined by Sider, as a possible response to Kripke’s
‘rotating disks’ argument against perdurance (Sider, 2001, 230–4). Sider’s goal was
to ground a distinction between rotating and non-rotating homogenous matter in
the primitive ontology and ideology of the perdurantist (i.e., someone who analyses
material persistence in terms of numerically distinct temporal parts of the persist-
ing object located at the dierent times at which the object exists).e trick is to
suppose that Best Systems laws might be formulated in terms of “physical continu-
ants”, i.e., aggregates of genidentity-interrelated material events where, crucially, the
non-Humean genidentity relation is not a primitive relation but supervenes on the
total history of Humean properties together with the laws in which it features:
Consider various ways of grouping stages together into physical contin-
87One might also worry that if the laws are about coordinate systems it will be hard for the
relationalist to avoid what Field (1985) calls heavy duty platonism. (anks to Jeremy Goodman for
highlighting this.) I take the role of coordinate systems in the specication of the Humean alternative
discussed next to be less problematic.
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uants. Relative to any such way, there are candidate laws of dynamics.
e correct grouping into physical continuants is that grouping that
results in the best candidate set of laws of dynamics; the correct laws
are the members of this candidate set. (Sider, 2001, 230)
e comparison of Huggett’s and Sider’s proposals prompts the following worry.
If Huggett’s reduction of inertial structure relies on primitive transtemporal particle
identity and Sider’s reduction of material genidentity relies on primitive inertial
structure, one or the other of the reductions must be untenable. In response, the
liberalHumeanmight embrace bothmoves at once: if one strips facts about transtem-
poral particle identity from a typical Leibnizian relational history compatible with
Newton’s laws, it remains very plausible that those laws will form part of any Best
System theory of such a world, if one is permitted to express the theory in terms
of supervenient genidentities with respect to supervenient privileged coordinate
systems. But combing both proposals into a single package highlights a related
diculty. Once the strict requirement that primitive vocabulary should express
primitive, perfectly natural properties and relations is relaxed, what governs which
quantities are part of the supervenience base and which quantities are supervenient?
Why stop at a reduction of genidentity and inertial structure? Why not seek to oer
a reductive account of mass and charge too? Why not even seek a reductive account
of the temporal metric and instantaneous spatial distances? Once the reduction via
the dynamical laws of some apparently natural properties to the others is on the
table, we need some principles to determine which properties are ripe for reduction
and which are to be part of the basic ideology.88
Huggett himself recognises the issue. He notes that he has included masses
and charges but not forces in his supervenience base because “a quantity can only
be said to be a force if it plays the right kind of role in the laws and so cannot be
metaphysically prior to the laws” (Huggett, 2006, 47).is is a surprising thing for
a Humean to say. As Huggett concedes, one might (as many non-Humeans do)
88If one pursues the programme too far, the supervenience base will eventually become too impov-
erished to subvene Newtonian laws. Suppose, for example, that the only spatiotemporal information
one retains is that which is common to all coordinatizations of the particle trajectories obtainable
from an initial inertial coordinate system by smooth but otherwise arbitrary coordinate transforma-
tions that preserve the timelike directedness of the trajectories (i.e., that they are nowhere tangent to
surfaces of constant time coordinate). Such topological data includes information about whether
any two trajectories ever intersect, and information about how the trajectories are ‘knotted’, but
little else. Many Newtonian worlds involving complex histories of relative distances and interactions
will be topologically equivalent to histories where all particles maintain constant distance from one
another. If one includes only such topological information in the supervenience base, worlds like
this will not be worlds where Newton’s laws are laws of nature. One might also wonder whether
any degree of topological complexity (i.e., any degree of complex entwining of the trajectories) will
promote Newton’s laws to Best System status. Might not simpler, equally strong alternatives always
be available?
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say the same about mass and charge. Later, when worrying that his supervenient
quantities proposal is “too easy”, he cites “serious objections, with a long history,
against the supposition of a non-material, physical substance” (ibid., 70) as reason to
pursue a reduction that at least allows one to do without spacetime. But, as we have
seen, (i) what prima facie strong objections there are to substantivalism can be met
and (ii), in the context of Newtonian theory, there are relationalist alternatives to
Huggett’s programme that do not suer from this particular problem for regularity
relationalism. Huggett does oer a criterion for determining a point beyond which
reduction should not be pursued: the laws should be such that they determine
the supervenient quantities in all nomically possible worlds (ibid., §4). However,
this does not address the possibility that, with respect to the same set of laws, two
distinct sets of putative subvening properties might share this property. In such a
case, how does one discover which set contains the “real” fundamental properties?
In his 2006 paper, Huggett only considers Newtonian worlds. We should con-
sider how the programme looks from the perspective of relativistic physics. Special
relativity does not provide a very hospitable arena for the view.e relative attrac-
tiveness of regularity relationalism in the context of Newtonian physics is due to
a couple of factors. First, the fact that the ideology of the Leibnizian relationalist
forms a natural subset of Newtonian ideology means that it is relatively natural to
seek a reductive account of the additional (inertial) structure in terms of Leibnizian
relations. Second, as reviewed in Section 6.1.1, the full neo-Newtonian ideology,
when restricted to a (point particle) relationalist ontology, is not sucient for a
relationalist account of standard physics, which underminines one obvious rela-
tionalist alternative. Neither factor remains true in the context of SR. In particular,
Leibnizian relations are quite unmotivated as a supervenience base; it is far more
natural to take the spacetime interval as basic and to understand the spatial distance
relations associated with any particular family of simultaneity surfaces in terms of
it. Moreover, if the relationalist is happy to countenance spatiotemporal relations
between material events as primitive, there is no longer a need for a reduction of
some spatiotemporal quantities in terms of others for, as reviewed in Section 6.1.2,
the Minkowski interval restricted to material events looks like a viable basis for a
relational interpretation of standard specially relativistic physics.
ings are more interesting when one moves to GR. One aspect of Huggett’s
proposal that I have not so far highlighted is that Huggett sees it as a way to allow the
geometry of empty space to supervene on the geometrical relations instantiated by
material bodies.89 Consider, for example, a history of instantaneous spatial relations
between bodies that are initially Euclidean but that depart from Euclidicity aer
some moment, perhaps then to return to Euclidicity aer some nite further time.
Suppose that this history is a solution of a (generalised) Newtonian theory set in
89is aspect of the proposal is scrutinised by Belot (2011, Ch. III).
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a three-dimensional space, G, of a xed geometry that is everywhere Euclidean
except for some nite, geometrically simple, non-Euclidean region.e particles
start out in the Euclidean region and eventual stray into the non-Euclidean region.
Huggett’s idea is that the relationalist can view both the geometry of the total space,
and the particles’ particular embedding in it, as supervenient on the history of
relations via (his liberalised version of) the Best Systems approach to laws. e
idea is that the following hypotheses jointly constitute the simplest and strongest
systematisation of the relational history: (i) the history of instantaneous relations
is constrained to be embeddable at all times into G and (ii) the relational history
follows, at any moment, from the instantaneous relations and the embedding into
G at that moment, together with a certain set of Newtonian laws. In particular,
the simplicity requirement xes G over other more complicated geometries into
which the particular relational history can also be embedded, e.g., geometries with
additional non-Euclidean regions unsurveyed by the material particles.90
Now recall the problem that the variable geometry of empty regions of spacetime
can cause for a relationist who would simply restrict spatiotemporal distance rela-
tions to material events: a particular partial history of pseudo-Riemannian relations
instantiated within an island conguration of material events, together with the
laws of GR, might not x the future history because of the possible inuences of the
geometry of empty spacetime beyond the material conguration (Section 6.1.2). In
the natural extension of Huggett’s scheme, one takes the entire history of instantiated
spatiotemporal relations between material events as the supervenience base. One
and only one future evolution of the material world compatible with the consid-
ered initial segment and laws of GR is, of course, included in this.e interesting
question for the liberalising Humean is whether, if facts about the geometry of empty
spacetime are allowed to supervene, together with the laws, on the material relational
history, the laws of GR will constitute the Best System laws of such a world.
6.3.2 e Dynamical Approach to Relativity
I nish this section by highlighting some of similarities between the dynamical
approach to special relativity, defended by Brown (2005) and by Brown and Pooley
(2006), and Huggett’s proposal for Newtonian physics.e dynamical approach
seeks to oer a reductive account of the Minkowski spacetime interval in terms of
the dynamical symmetries of the laws governing matter. It therefore qualies as a
type of relationalism, although this is not something that Brown himself emphasises.
90Simplicity will not determine a unique geometry for G in all cases, but Huggett makes a per-
suasive case that the underdetermination is benign and that the regularity relationalist should be
content to live with the possibility that there may be no determinate fact of the matter about the
geometry of physical space (Huggett, 2006, 55–6).
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One of the guiding intuitions behind the dynamical approach concerns ex-
planatory priority. Consider, for example, the relativistic phenomenon of length
contraction. Do rods behave as they do in virtue of the spatiotemporal environment
in which they are immersed, or are facts about the geometrical structure of space-
time reducible (inter alia) to the behaviour of rods? And if one opts for the latter
point of view, what explanation is to be given of why measuring rods in motion are
contracted relative to similarly constituted rods at rest?
Brown reads Bell (1976) as seeking to demonstrate that “a moving rod contracts,
and amoving clock dilates, because of how it is made up and not because of the nature
of its spatio-temporal environment” (Brown, 2005, 8, emphasis in the original). And,
Brown thinks, Bell was surely right.is, though, is to present a false dichotomy.
e substantivalist should claim that a moving rod’s contraction reects both how it
is made up and the nature of its spatiotemporal environment.91 Recall the discussion
of the explanatory role of substantival geometry in Section 4.3.e substantivalist
should agree that a complex material rod does not conform to the axioms of some
geometry simply because that is the substantival geometry in which its is immersed;
the rod would not do what it does were the laws governing its microphysical parts
dierent in key respects. But equally, according to the substantivalist, the coordinate-
dependent equations that are appealed to in, for example, Bell’s toy-model derivation
of length contraction make implicit reference, via the choice of coordinate system,
to primitive spatiotemporal geometry.
What features of the laws governing the constituents of a rod are responsible
for the rod’s characteristic relativistic behaviour such as its length contraction?
In an important sense, the details of the dynamics are irrelevant. If subject to
appropriately non-destructive accelerations, rods made of steel, wood and glass
will contract by the same amount, and for the same reason, namely, the Lorentz
covariance of the laws governing their constituents.92 In recent discussion of the
91is is not to say that every explanatory question one might ask about the phenomenon of
length contraction requires an appeal to dynamical laws; in some contexts it is enough to cite the
relevant geometrical facts in order to provide an explanation.is is a point explicitly emphasised
in Brown and Pooley (2006, 78–9, 82), where paradigm explanatory uses of Minkowski diagrams
(e.g., to highlight that observers in relative motion consider dierent cross-sections of a rod’s world
tube when judging its length) are said to constitute “perfectly acceptable explanations (perhaps the
only acceptable explanations) of the explananda in question.” Our emphasis of this fact seems to
have been overlooked by some authors (Skow, 2006; Frisch, 2011).
92As it was put in Brown and Pooley (2006, 82): “it is sucient for these bodies to undergo
Lorentz contraction that the laws (whatever they are) that govern the behaviour of theirmicrophysical
constituents are Lorentz covariant. It is the fact that the laws are Lorentz covariant. . . that explains why
the bodies Lorentz contract. To appeal to any further details of the laws that govern the cohesion of
these bodies would be a mistake.” Janssen’s (2009) carefully argued case that phenomena recognised
to be kinematical (in his sense) should not be explained in terms of the details of their dynamics is
therefore one that we had antecedently conceded.e explanation of the phenomena in terms of
symmetries nonetheless deserves the label “dynamical” (though not, as acknowledged in Brown and
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dynamical approach (e.g., Janssen, 2009; Frisch, 2011), this point is widely agreed
upon. As Frisch emphasises, what genuine disagreement there is centres on the
status of the dynamical symmetries to which such explanations appeal.
For Balashov and Janssen, these are ultimately to be explained in terms of
the geometry of spacetime. To the question: “Does the Minkowskian nature of
spacetime explain why the forces holding a rod together are Lorentz invariant or the
other way around?”, they reply: “Our intuition is that the geometrical structure of
space(-time) is the explanans here and the invariance of the forces the explanandum”
(Balashov and Janssen, 2003, 340) and Janssen likes to talk of the symmetries of
Minkowski geometry as the common origin of the symmetries of the various laws
governing matter. For geometry to play this role, its instantiation in the physical
world had better not depend on facts about the dynamical laws. is is true on
the substantivalist view reviewed in Section 4.3 but, note, that it is also true on
the Minkowski relationalist view discussed in Section 6.1.2, which likewise takes
both the ideology of the spacetime interval and its satisfying the constraints of
Minkowski geometry as primitive.
How does this alleged explanation of dynamical symmetries in terms of space-
time symmetries go? Clearly it will not be any kind of causal explanation. Moreover,
as the examples of Galilean (or Maxwellian) invariant Newtonian physics set in
Newtonian (or Galilean) spacetime illustrate,93 the explanation must be compat-
ible with the logical possibility of theories in which there is a mismatch between
dynamical symmetries and the symmetries of independently postulated spacetime
structure (Brown and Pooley, 2006, 83–4).
In these cases, the mismatches are all in one direction; the spacetime symmetries
are a proper subset of the dynamical symmetries. It might be thought that the
substantivalist can readily explain this.94 On their view, dynamical laws ultimately
involve coordinate-independent claims describing how dynamically varying matter
is constrained by and adapted to spacetime structure. If the properties of spacetime
structure are described explicitly, these laws should be expressible by equations that
hold good in any coordinate system. But if the spacetime structure has symmetries
that allow for a privileged set of adapted coordinate systems, one expects these
equations will (apparently) simplify, as some aspects of the spacetime structure
will now be encoded in the coordinate system. Recall that, in coordinate terms,
dynamical symmetries are transformations between coordinate systems in which
Pooley (2006, 83), “constructive”) because the explanantia are (in the rst instance) the dynamical
symmetries of the laws governing the material systems manifesting the phenomena.
93Other examples are provided by Lorentz invariant dynamics set in Newtonian spacetime; see,
e.g., Earman (1989, 50–5).
94I am grateful to Hilary Greaves for discussion of this point.e story given here can also be
told,mutatis mutandis, by a relationalist who posits primitive spatiotemporal relations held to satisfy
primitive geometrical constraints.
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the equations expressing the laws take the same form. If the equations in question
are the special, simplied equations, then, on the substantivalist’s understanding
of these equations, (i) they should hold in all coordinate systems appropriately
adapted to spacetime structure, and (ii) they need not hold in others. But, in terms
of coordinates, spacetime symmetries just are the transformations between adapted
coordinate systems. Hence, the dynamical symmetries should include the spacetime
symmetries. And, very crudely, the possibility that dynamical symmetries outstrip
spacetime symmetries arises because the dynamical laws governing matter might
exploit only some of the spacetime structure, so that the coordinate systems in which
dynamics simplies need be adapted to only some of the structure postulated.95
Given the substantivalist’s understanding of the coordinate-dependent forms of
dynamical equations, therefore, it follows that the symmetries of these equations
cannot bemore restricted than the symmetries of the full set of postulated spacetime
structures. In at least this sense, the substantivalist can explain dynamical sym-
metries in terms of spacetime symmetries. According to the dynamical approach,
however, this gets things exactly the wrong way round. Facts about dynamical
symmetries come rst and are the ground of true claims about the geometry of
spacetime: “theMinkowskianmetric is nomore than a codication of the behaviour
of rods and clocks, or equivalently, it is no more than the Kleinian geometry asso-
ciated with the symmetry group of the quantum physics of the non-gravitational
interactions in the theory of matter” (Brown, 2005, 9).
If spacetime geometry is to be grounded in the symmetries of the dynamical
laws governing matter, it had better be the case that the very idea of such a law and
its symmetries does not presuppose spacetime geometry.at it need not do so is
particularly clear if a Humean conception of laws is adopted.is will also bring out
the parallels with Huggett’s proposal. Recall that Huggett’s regularity relationalist
postulates primitive Leibnizian relations but no ideology corresponding to inertial
structure.e latter is grounded in the existence of a proper subset of the coordinate
systems adapted to the Leibnizian relations with respect to which the description of
the entire relational history is the solution of particularly simple equations (Newton’s
laws expressed with respect to inertial frame coordinates).e dynamical approach
involves a similar but much more radical move: the metrical relations themselves
are to be grounded in exactly the same way.
e idea is best illustrated with a simple example.e advocate of the dynam-
ical approach need not be understood as eschewing all primitive spatiotemporal
notions (pace Norton, 2008). In particular, one might take as basic the “topological”
extendedness of the material world in four dimensions. Imagine such a world whose
only material dynamical entity has pointlike parts whose degrees of freedom can
95See Earman (1989, 45–7) for a related discussion of the connection between spacetime symme-
tries and dynamical symmetries.
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be modelled by the real numbers. One obtains a coordinate description of such an
entity by associating, in a way that respects its local topology, each of its pointlike
parts with distinct elements of R4, and associating with each of these a real number
representing the dynamical state of the corresponding part. In other words, we di-
rectly map the parts of the material eld postulated to be the sole entity in the world
into R4 and choose a way to represent its dynamical state so as to obtain a scalar
eld onR4. Dierent choices of coordinate system will yield dierent mathematical
descriptions. Suppose, now, that for some special choice of coordinate system the
description one obtains is the solution of a very simple equation. Moreover, suppose
that (i) the descriptions one obtains relative to coordinate systems related to this
rst coordinate system by Lorentz transformations yield (distinct) descriptions that
are solutions of the very same equation but that (ii) descriptions with respect to
other coordinate systems, if they can be represented as solutions of equations at all,
are solutions of more complicated equations.
If all this were the case, the simplest equation might be considered one of the
Humean laws of this world.96e Lorentz group’s being their dynamical symmetry
group is constituted by its being the group thatmaps between the coordinate systems
with respect to which descriptions of the material world satisfy the simple equation.
And nally, the spatiotemporal geometry of the world is dened in terms of the
invariants of the symmetry group so identied. In particular, for the spatiotemporal
interval between two parts of the material world p, q to be I just is for (tp − tq)2 −∣x⃗p − x⃗q∣2 = ±I(p, q)2 with respect to the privileged coordinate systems. Spacetime
geometry is reduced to a notion of dynamical symmetry that does not presuppose
it.e example considered is, of course, very simple, and a number of issues will
arise when eshing out an analogous story for more realistic physics. Some of the
choices to be made are highlighted by Norton (2008), who denies the feasibility of
exactly this kind of project. Two charges he makes are worth dwelling on.
First, he considers the case where the world contains several matter elds, each
described by a distinct theory. He grants that each of these might be Lorentz in-
variant. His challenge to the advocate of the dynamical approach (dubbed the
“constructivist”) is to justify the assumption that the sets of coordinate systems with
respect to which these cases of Lorentz invariance are manifest coincide.e simple
answer is that the spatiotemporally coincident parts of distinct matter elds should be
assigned the same element of R4.e issue is how this relation of coincidence be-
tween matter elds is to be understood. For the substantivalist it involves colocation
at the same spacetime point.eMinkowski relationalist, who takes interval facts as
primitive, can analyse it in terms of these (though not, of course, straightforwardly
96is law could be expressed in a coordinate-independent manner if one introduces an auxiliary
device, the Minkowski metric, which would then be “no more than a codication of the Kleinian
geometry associated with the symmetry group” of the laws.
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in terms of the vanishing of the interval, for this will not exclude non-coincident,
lightlike related events). What options are open to the constructivist?e most nat-
ural is to take spatiotemporal coincidence as primitive (as many relationalists have
done; e.g., Rovelli (1997, 194)). Aer all, the project was to reduce chronogeometric
facts to symmetries, not to recover the entire spatiotemporal nature of the world
from no spatiotemporal assumptions whatsoever.e constructivist’s project might
need a primitive notion of “being contiguous”, but Norton is wrong to think that
it follows from this that constructivists are illicitly committed to the independent
existence of spacetime.97
e other of Norton’s objections that I wish to highlight involves what the
constructivist must say about the geometry of empty regions of spacetime and of
regions containing homogeneous matter. Suppose some way K of coordinatizing
the material world satises the type of condition described above. Now suppose
that the world contains an empty region of spacetime. Translated into our terms,
Norton’s point is that any K′ that agrees with K on its assignment of coordinates
to material events will yield the same description. K′ can dier from K in any way
one likes over the coordinates it assigns to the empty region. Does this leave the
geometry of the empty region indeterminate? Put this way, that there really is no
problem here should be obvious: for the constructivist there is literally nothing in an
empty region and so nothing whose geometrical properties might be indeterminate.
e constructivist does not believe in the existence of an independently existing
spacetime!
e case of homogeneous matter is more problematic. Now one is supposing
there are entities—the material pointlike parts of the homogeneous region—whose
spatiotemporal relatedness one would like to be able to enquire aer. Suppose that
the constructivist has attributed some primitive topogical properties to matter. Even
so, we can respect these properties and smoothly alter K to K′ within the region
to obtain exactly the same description. e constructivist is forced to conclude
that for any two material events in the region there is no fact of the matter con-
cerning the interval between them. How bad is this? Note that a number of other
geometrical properties will be determinate (because invariant under all coordinate
transformations that leave the description of matter unaltered). For example, the
97More radical options could also be pursued. Starting with the idea that there are no primitive
facts about the contiguity or otherwise of distinct material events, one might nonetheless map them
into a single copy of Rn . e coincidence of events (which events are to be mapped to the same
element in Rn) is then to be thought of as determined in the same manner as the spacetime interval,
i.e., determined by those coordinatizations that yield total descriptions of all events that satisfy some
simple set of equations. Perhaps one could even view the value of n (i.e., the dimensionality of
spacetime itself) as determined in this way too. As with generalizations of Huggett’s proposal (see
footnote 88), the more one views as grounded via some kind of Best System prescription, the more
unconstrained the problem becomes; it ceases to be plausible that the complexity of the postulated
supervenience base will be sucient to underwrite the target quantities and the laws they obey.
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spacetime volume of the homogeneous region might be determinate even though
the spatiotemporal relatedness of the points within it is not.98is is surely a pecu-
liarity of the constructivist’s position. But, like Huggett’s regularity relationalist in
the face of analogous problems (Huggett, 2006, 55-6), they might argue that it is not
such a painful bullet to have to bite.
7 Substantivalism in Light of the Hole Argument
For much of the last 25 years, arguments about spacetime substantivalism have been
dominated by discussion of the Hole Argument.is is not the place for a thorough
review of the sizeable literature that the argument has spawned.99 Here I wish only
to highlight one form of substantivalism that evades the Hole Argument and to
emphasise an important disanalogy between the Hole Argument and the arguments
against Newtonian and Galilean substantivalism that were considered in earlier
sections.
Originally due to Einstein, who used it prior to 1915 to explain away his inability
(at that point in time) to nd satisfactory generally covariant eld equations, theHole
Argument was rehabilitated by John Stachel (1989) before being put to work against
spacetime substantivalism by Earman and Norton (1987). LetM1 = ⟨M , gab , Tab⟩
be a model of a generally relativistic theory.100 It follows from the dieomorphism
invariance of GR that, for an arbitrary dieomorphism d,M2 = ⟨M , d∗gab , d∗Tab⟩
will also satisfy the theory’s equations.e natural (though not ineluctable) conclu-
sion is thatM1 andM2 jointly represent spacetimes (call themW1 andW2) that are
physically possible according to the theory.
InM1, each p ∈ M is assigned certain properties encoded by ⟨gab(p), Tab(p)⟩; in
M2, p is assigned the (in general) distinct properties encoded by ⟨d∗gab(p), d∗Tab(p)⟩.
But, according to the substantivalist,M represent physical spacetime.is means
that (on one natural understanding of how the points ofM represent physical space-
time points)M1 andM2 represent one and the same spacetime point as having
dierent properties.is gives us the next ingredient in the argument: the claim
that the substantivalist is committed to regardingW1 andW2 as distinct possible
worlds.101
98Compare how, on some treatments of vagueness, disjunctions can be determinately true (Fred
is either bald or not bald) even though neither disjunct is determinately true.
99A good introduction is provided by Norton (2011).
100Recall (section 4) that the pseudo-Riemannian metric tensor gab encodes all of the geometrical
properties of spacetime, itself represented by the four-dimensional manifoldM. Strictly speaking,
the stress–energy tensor Tab does not directly represent the fundamental matter content of the
model.is will be represented by other elds, in terms of which Tab is dened.
101is amounts to the denial of Lebniz Equivalence, Earman and Norton’s “acid test” of substanti-
valism (Earman and Norton, 1987, 521).
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e problem is that, if this interpretation of spacetime models is permitted, GR
is radically indeterministic. Let d be a hole dieomorphism, a map that it is only
nontrivial within a restricted region ofM (the so-called hole). Suppose that, relative
to the metric ofM1, d is nontrivial only to the future of some spacelike surface, Σ.
M1 andM2 will then be identical structures up to and including this surface but
dier to its future. On the proposed interpretation ofM1 andM2, they represent
spacetimes that are identical up to the spacelike surface represented by Σ but that
dier to its future. It follows that the equations of GR, together with a complete
specication of the history of the world up to some spacelike surface, fail to x
the future. Earman and Norton do not see this as a problem for substantivalism
because they think indeterminism is objectionable per se. eir claim, rather, is
that determinism should fail only for reasons of physics and not as the result of a
metaphysical commitment and in a theory-independent way (Earman and Norton,
1987, 524).
Note thatM1 andM2 are isomorphic structures.e possibilities they represent,
therefore, involve exactly the same patterns of qualitative features. IfW1 andW2 are
distinct possibilities, they dier only over which spacetime points instantiate which
of the particular features common to both worlds. In the terminology of modal
metaphysics, the dierence between the possibilities is merely haecceitistic (Kaplan,
1975). Many of the pro-substantivalist responses to the argument make crucial use
of this aspect of the setup.
For example, a substantivalist might agree that accepting GR involves a commit-
ment to such haecceitistic distinctions and accept that the theory is indeterministic.
However, they might deny that this indeterminism is in any sense troublesome
precisely because it is an indeterminism only about which objects instantiate which
properties and not about which patterns of properties are instantiated. A closely
related response accepts that GR is committed to haecceitistic distinctions but
denies that it follows that GR is indeterministic because the correct denition of
determinism, it is claimed, is only sensitive to qualitative dierences.102
e most popular response, however, has been to advocate some variety of so-
phisticated substantivalism, i.e., a version of substantivalism that denies the existence
of physically possible spacetimes that dier merely haecceitistically.e simplest
way to secure this is to endorse antihaecceitism, i.e., the general denial of merely
haecceitistic distinctions between possible worlds.103
102For further discussion of the denition of determinism appropriate to GR, and of the merits
of these options, see Buttereld (1989b), Rynasiewicz (1994), Belot (1995), Leeds (1995), Brighouse
(1997) and Melia (1999).
103is is my preferred option (see Pooley, 2006, 99-103). Despite the important dierences
between them, I take Maudlin (1989), Buttereld (1989a), Maidens (1992), Stachel (1993, 2002),
Brighouse (1994), Rynasiewicz (1994), Hoefer (1996) and Saunders (2003a) all to deny that the
relevant haecceitistic dierences correspond to distinct physical possibilities. For several of these
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Two arguments discussed earlier in the chapter also involved the claim that,
because of the dynamical symmetries of the relevant physical theory, the (relevant
stripe of) substantivalist was committed to distinct physically possible worlds, the
nonidentity of which was alleged to be problematic. e important dierence
between these cases and those of the Hole Argument is that the former involve
qualitative dierences between the relevant worlds. In the case of the kinematic
shi, the worlds dier over the absolute velocities assigned to bodies. In the case
of Maxwellian invariant dynamics set in Galilean spacetime, they dier over the
absolute accelerations assigned to bodies.104 e fact that these dierences are
qualitative has two important consequences.
First, that the possibilities dier qualitatively creates an epistemological problem
(given that one cannot observationally distinguish between the relevant quantities)
that is not present in the case of merely haecceitistic dierences.105 Even if dieo-
morphic models of GR are to be interpreted as representing distinct possibilities,
there is no substantive fact, about which I could be ignorant despite knowing all the
observable facts, concerning which model really represents the actual world. Each
model is equally apt, and which model represents the actual world will be a matter
of (arbitrary) representational convention. In contrast, models of Galilean invariant
physics set in Newtonian spacetime that dier by boosts of their material content
are not equally suited to represent any given possibility. Even once representational
conventions are xed, the Newtonian substantivalist does not know whether the
model that attributes a velocity of 10ms−1 to the Eiel Tower, the one that attributes
20ms−1, or yet some other model, corresponds to the actual world.
Second, the antihaecceitist way out of the Hole dilemma is of no use in the
context of the kinematic shi argument.e argument is evaded if any two models
related by Galilean boosts can be shown to be dierent representations of the
same state of aairs. Since the models represent qualitatively distinct possibilities
according to the Newtonian substantivalist, merely embracing antihaecceitism does
not collapse the distinction between them. A substantivalist position that can view
Galilean boosted models as distinct representations of one and the same state of
authors (though notably not for Maudlin), the commitment follows from a commitment to some
kind of antihaecceitism, at least concerning spacetime points, whether on general philosophical
grounds (as in Hoefer’s case), or as a perceived lesson of the dieomorphism invariance of the
physics (as in Stachel’s case).
104Note one parallel between the Hole Argument and the argument against Galilean spacetime
that exploits the Maxwell group.e fact that the Maxwell group involves a parameter that is an
arbitrary function of time means that the Galilean substantivalist interpretation of the models of a
Maxwellian invariant theory involves regarding the theory as indeterministic (cf. Stein, 1977; Saunders,
2003a).e fact that the indeterminism involves qualitative dierences (according to the Galilean
substantivalist) arguably makes the argument more eective against Galilean substantivalism than
the Hole Argument is against GR.
105is point is discussed by Horwich (1978), Field (1985) and Maudlin (1993).
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aairs requires substantive work, viz., the replacement of Newton’s substantival
space with neo-Newtonian spacetime. (A similar observation holds concerning the
passage from neo-Newtonian to Newton-Cartan spacetime.)is is in contrast to
the so-called static shi argument against Newton’s absolute space, which exploits
the Euclidean symmetries of Newtonian mechanics and compares only models
related by time-independent rotations or translations.106 In this case antihaecceitism
does collapse the number of relevant physical possibilities to one.
It is enough to note that antihaecceitism is a live viewwithinmetaphysics in order
to see that substantivalism need not fall to the Hole Argument. More controversial
is how well-motivated the position is from the perspective of the interpretation of
physics. Here a couple of remarks are in order.
First, as Belot and Earman (1999, 2001) have stressed, several physicists grap-
pling with the conceptual and technical problems of unifying quantum mechanics
and general relativity do claim to draw substantive morals from the Hole Argument.
What is not clear, however, is whether the genuinely substantive interpretational
questions that have come to the fore as a result of work on the quantisation of GR
have anything to do with the kind of dieomorphism invariance that lies at the
heart of the Hole Argument. One key issue concerns the nature of the “observables”
(i.e., the genuine physical magnitudes) of dieomorphism-invariant theories. An-
other concerns dierences between GR and pre-generally relativistic theories. In
particular, are the true physical magnitudes of GR essentially dierent in kind to
those of pre-GR theories (when the latter are properly understood)? Whilst Earman
(2006a,b) believes that the right answers to these questions will be inconsistent with
anything like a substantivalist interpretation of GR, even of the sophisticated variety,
it is not obvious that some of the views about the nature of “observables” advocated
by the physicists Earman cites, such as those of Rovelli (2002), are incompatible
with sophisticated substantivalism.
Second, some of the work on “structural realist” interpretations of spacetime, at
least where these do not involve an eliminativism about spacetime points, can be
understood as varieties of antihaecceitist substantivalism.107 It is possible that the
development of one of these will provide a coherent and plausible motivation for
106An argument like this was made by Leibniz in his correspondence with Clarke (Alexander,
1956).at Leibniz makes a precisely parallel argument, exploiting permutation invariance, against
the existence of atoms, should give those sympathetic to the static shi argument pause for thought.
Consistency should lead one either to embrace or reject both conclusions.
107Self-declared structuralist approaches to spacetime that are best described as varieties of sub-
stantivalism (in the sense that they include spacetime points amongst the ground-oor ontology)
include those of Stachel (2002, 2006), Saunders (2003a), Esfeld and Lam (2008) and Muller (2011).
For an overview of a wider range of structuralist approaches, see Greaves (2011), who gives reasons
to be sceptical that a coherent position that does not collapse into sophisticated substantivalism
(or relationalism) has yet to be clearly identied. Bain (2006) is another advocate of spacetime
structuralism, not cited by Greaves.
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sophisticated substantivalism.108
e upshot of this section is that the substantivalist understanding of space-
time physics, as set out in Section 4, is not undermined by the Hole Argument.
What, then, should one conclude about the relative merits of substantivalism ver-
sus relationalism? In Section 5 I considered and rejected two other strands of
antisubstantivalist argument that have motivated recent relationalists.at leaves
substantivalism as a going concern. What about relationalism? Of the three general
strategies outlined, the most promising is theMachian, 3-space approach of Barbour
and collaborators. But, recall, this turned out not to be a form of relationalism in the
traditional, ontological sense. It does represent an approach that is metaphysically
very dierent from spacetime orthodoxy, but the dividing issue is not the existence
of spacetime points but the relative priority of 3-dimensional versus 4-dimensional
concepts.
e other two relationalist approaches fare less well. Recognising that the
Maxwell group is a symmetry group of Newtonian physics allows for an intriguing
and relatively overlooked form of enriched relationalism, but it does not generalise
to relativistic physics. In the context of SR, the restriction of Minkowski distances to
a material ontology already provides for a viable, if unexciting, form of relationalism.
In the context of GR, however, the same move does not work: in general, the dynam-
ically signicant chronometric facts outstrip the chronometric facts about matter,
as is most vividly illustrated by the abundance of interesting vacuum solutions.
e relationalist approach reviewed in Section 6.3 has not been pursued in the
context of GR. Instead, a popular move for relationalists has been to treat the metric
eld as just another material eld (see, e.g., Rovelli, 1997, 193–5). is, it turns
out, is also the view endorsed by Brown (2005, Ch. 9). So, whilst the “dynamical
approach” to relativity provides a reductive account of the metric—i.e., is a form
of have-it-all relationalism—in the context of SR (Section 6.3.2) the same is not
true, for Brown at least, in GR. Brown stresses that the metric eld only gains its
usual “chronometrical signicance” (i.e., only corresponds to the practical geometry
108I am attracted to the view that sees individualistic facts as grounded in general facts (Pooley,
unpublished). However, as Dasgupta (whose terminology I adopt) has recently stressed (Dasgupta,
2011, 131–4), this requires that one’s understanding of general facts does not presuppose individualistic
facts. Since the standard understanding of general facts arguably does take individualistic facts for
granted, the spacetime structuralist/sophisticated substantivalist must show that they are not illicitly
making the same presupposition. (Dasgupta’s own view is that something quite radical is needed
(2011, 147–52).)e recent literature on “weak discernibility” (see, e.g., Saunders, 2003b) has made
much of the fact that numerical diversity facts can supervene on facts statable without the identity
predicate even when traditional forms of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles are violated.
Note, however, that merely showing that one set of facts supervene on another set of facts is not
sucient to show that the former are grounded in the latter (or even that it is possible to think of
them as so grounded).
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manifest by the behaviour of material rods and clocks) in virtue of the particular
way it dynamically couples to matter, but, as I hope to have made clear, no sensible
substantivalist should demur.
What, then, is at stake between the metric-reifying relationalist and the tra-
ditional substantivalist? Both parties accept the existence of a substantival en-
tity, whose structural properties are characterised mathematically by a pseudo-
Riemannian metric eld and whose connection to the behaviour of material rods
and clocks depends on, inter alia, the truth of the strong equivalence principle. It
is hard to resist the suspicion that this corner of the debate is becoming merely
terminological. At least this much that can be said for the choice of substantivalist
language: it underlines an important continuity between the “absolute” spacetime
structures that feature in pre-generally relativistic physics and the entity that all sides
of the current dispute admit is a fundamental element of reality. To the extent that
one should seek to understand the content and success of previous theories in terms
of our current best theory, this arguably vindicates the substantivalist interpretation
of Newtonian and specially relativistic physics.109
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